we insist upon this amendment it will effectually kill this Bill. Upon that subject, also, I should hesitate to give a vote in favor of the motion of the Hon. Minister of Justice, did I suppose it would have that effect, but I am happy to say, in considering the matter and looking at the authorities, I find it cannot have any such effect, because while we cannot make an amendment of our own it is quite open to the House to reconsider their action upon the subject and to make a consequential amendment to this which we now insist upon. I find the doctrine very clearly laid down in Bourinot, and before we come to a vote upon this question I think it is quite right that the House should understand it and that we should not be deterred from giving an opinion on this question by any consideration such as I have expressed myself—that is, that the Act might not go into operation. Bourinot, at page 553, says:—

"If one House agree to the amendments made in a Bill by the other House, a message is returned to that effect, and the Bill is consequently ready to be submitted to the Governor-General. In case the amendments are objected to, a member may propose that the amendments be considered that day three or six months; and when such a motion is agreed to, the Bill is practically defeated for that session. But under ordinary circumstances, when there is a desire to pass the Bill if possible, a member will move that the amendments be disagreed to for certain reasons, which are communicated by message to the other House where the amendments were made. These reasons are moved after the second reading of the amendments. If the Senate or Commons do not adhere to their amendments, on the reasons being communicated to them, they return a message that 'They do not insist, etc., etc,' and no further action need be taken on the subject. But if they 'insist on their amendment,' then the other House will be called upon to consider whether it will continue to disagree or waive its objection in order to save the Bill."

And how that is done is pointed out immediately after on page 554:—

2. Neither House can regularly, at this stage, insert any new provision, or amend, or omit any part of a bill it has passed itself, and sent up to the other House for concurrence. But it is perfectly in order to propose any amendment to an amendment made by the one House to a bill of the other House, provided it is consequential in its nature: that is to say, consequent upon or relevant to the amendment under consideration.

Therefore, when this amendment is insisted upon, as it probably will be, and goes to another place, it will then be for the House there to return a consequential amendment, for example, in the direction I have indicated as regards its operation upon counties that have already passed upon this Act, and in that way a solution of the matter could be arrived at. I am quite sure, from the feeling which has been evinced by the gentlemen to whom I have mentioned the subject, that they will be very much disposed to favorably receive any suggestion like this to get out of the difficulty; because while we insist upon the constitutional doctrine as to the power of Parliament to change the law, still we desire to give every facility to persons situated as those are in counties where the Act has been adopted, to have the benefit of the Act if they desire it, and it can be done in the way I suggest. At the same time I cannot too strongly insist that not only it is a new and most unheard of doctrine, that Parliament not only cannot alter an Act which it has passed, but cannot make a new provision. I have only to refer to the history of this Canada Temperance Act; we have been altering that Act constantly, and the changes affect all counties in which the Act is in operation. Every detail of the Bill before us shows that we have acted on that principle. What was the Liquor License Act of 1883, passed five years after the Canada Temperance Act, but a measure to interfere with the operation of the Canada Temperance Act, and in my own county, in which the Temperance Act was in force, the Liquor Licence Act was also in operation. Nobody, in the discussions on the Liquor License Act of 1883, ever pretended to say that it was unconstitutional, or that we should not make such an enactment because it affected the previous law in force in certain counties throughout the Dominion. I hope I have made those two points clear, first, that I should be willing to give every facility to have this matter reconsidered in another place, which, fortunately, by the usages of Parliament, it can be, and, second, to insist strongly on the right of Parliament to legislate on any matter on which they have legislated before.