

as April 16, 1970. Thus the original act, the one I am proposing to amend, effectively predated the establishment of the Department of the Environment by a couple of years, a fact which explains why the department was left out of the enforcement provisions.

The purpose of Bill C-207 is to place the Department of the Environment front and centre, where it belongs, in Arctic waters pollution prevention. The present law gives responsibility for the enforcement of the act to various ministers. More accurately, under section 26, the governor in council is empowered to delegate authority under the act. What happened was this: by an order in council dated May 14, 1971, those powers were delegated to three departments. Responsibility for dealing with pollution caused by shipping was allocated to the Department of Transport; responsibility for control of waste deposits was assigned to the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and also to the Ministry of Energy, Mines and Resources. The basic problem with such a delegation is that too many departments are now actively engaged in pollution control in the north—at least five when other acts are considered. This situation has led to enormous confusion for industry, government and others. It has confused people as to where responsibility lies. By the same token, it has proliferated authority and thereby seriously weakened accountability. The resultant duplication and overlapping of authority and initiative have hampered effective action to control pollution in the Arctic and in the north generally. My bill seeks, first, to streamline administrative responsibility for the control and prevention of pollution in the north.

Second, and even more important, the bill will transfer responsibility for environmental protection in the Arctic from government departments having a vested interest in industrial development to the Department of the Environment, which does not have such an interest. Indeed, the Department of the Environment was established because the government of the day recognized the danger of assigning environmental assessments to "proponents" of development such as the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development.

In the Speech from the Throne in 1970, we find the following words:

There is an inherent conflict of interest . . . between those who are seeking the exploitation of non-renewable resources and those who are charged with the responsibility of protecting the environment.

Yet the Department of the Environment has never been named as an administrator or even as a co-operating agency for the enforcement of the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act. Because of the conflict of interest arising from the same people being responsible for industrial development and pollution protection, we find there is a great deal of rightful dissatisfaction with measures being taken to combat pollution in the Arctic. Is it any wonder that the government's performance to date in protecting the Arctic environment has been so severely criticized by environmental organizations, by scientists, and even by its own officials?

The most obvious example of this neglect and deficiency relates to resource exploration and development by Dome

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Petroleum Limited and its subsidiary Canadian Marine Drilling Limited—Canmar, as it is known—in the Beaufort Sea region. The government received applications from Dome Petroleum in respect of certain projects in late June, 1979. They concerned facilities at McKinley Bay for an over-wintering harbour, at Tuk harbour for a deep harbour entrance, and at Wise Bay for a fuelling staging area.

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I do not want to get into too much detail about the complexities of the environmental procedures followed in such cases. Let me simply summarize by saying that first there is the initial environmental screening to determine whether any project has significant environmental consequences. A second and later procedure is the formal environmental assessment and review, which applies to major projects and which is brought into the picture if the initial screening identifies a significant environmental impact. All this is co-ordinated by the Federal Environmental Assessment Review Office of the Department of the Environment. It is called FEARO. The catch is that the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development is the federal government's principal operating arm in the Yukon and Northwest Territories. There is clear evidence that that department has been successful in getting the federal government to approve the applications I have mentioned, and others, too, without assessments as to their environmental consequences.

It has done so against the advice of even its own frontline advisory bodies. I have in mind the Arctic Waters Advisory Committee, AWAC; and the Regional Ocean Dumping Advisory Committee, RODAC. The latter, RODAC, recommended, for example, the deferral of issuance of any ocean-dumping or associated land-use permits for dredging or harbour development at McKinley Bay—I use that as an illustration—"until the initial environmental evaluation report has been filed by the company and assessed by the government". Yet that permit, and others, were issued in late August, within weeks of being applied for without such a procedure having been followed.

The Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, in an excellent study by Dr. William Rees published in *Northern Perspectives*, sums up the situation succinctly, and I quote from that study as follows:

The over-all conclusion pertaining to EARP is inescapable. Given the "ludicrous" time-frame, skimpy data base, and direct interference from Ottawa, the best efforts of AWAC/RODAC could not satisfy the minimal requirements of a rigorous and effective screening process.

The findings of Dr. Rees are well supported in a confidential report I was able to obtain recently of the government's own Arctic Waters Advisory Committee. That report, which I have in my hand now, is dated February 8, 1980. I do not have time to quote extensively from the report, but let me just highlight a few of its findings and alarming details. Among other things it says:

Government decision-making processes resulting in approvals for land-based support facilities, and dredging for the approach to Tuk and inside McKinley