the hearing in camera; (b) the board will hear the evidence against the accused in the presence of the accused and his counsel and, (c) nevertheless the board may direct that the minister shall furnish to the board and the appellant the particulars of the allegations without disclosing the sources thereof.

What would be the effect in practice of this suggested procedure? The effect would be that the minister would provide a certificate saying that the case in question was a security matter and that a disclosure of the sources of information would be against the national interest. At that point the minister would provide the board and the appellant with a general statement as to the grounds on which the deportation order or the refusal of the application for admission was based. The statement may say: You were in Algeria between such and such years and you were guilty of acts of violence, or it may say, you were engaged in acts of robbery or other such acts in such and such a country during those years, and no more than that. The statement may say: You were a member of the Communist party in country A between such and such years. I say to the minister that while this information may not be adequate in an ordinary court hearing it would at least enable the person concerned to produce evidence to meet that allegation, if he can.

The amendment says that if the board so determines it can hold a hearing in camera and it can hear the officer of the department or the officer of the R.C.M.P. in the absence of the accused. It seems to me, after having read *Hansard*, that perhaps the minister did not understand the reference which I made in an earlier speech. I would therefore like to draw to his attention again my own personal experience, because this is the way in which we learn about these things. As I previously informed the house, about a year ago a client of mine, a certain employee of a government corporation, was refused certain rights in an alleged security matter. A royal commission of inquiry was appointed consisting of one person and certain information was provided to him similar to the particulars suggested in this amendment. Neither the person concerned nor I as his counsel were present when the commissioner heard the evidence against my client. The commissioner then asked him questions which were obviously based on the information he had received. My client was able to give answers and to persuade the commissioner that the allegation that he was a security risk was incorrect, and the commissioner so informed the Minister of Justice. Thereafter the man regained the rights which he had lost.

I say to the minister that on the basis of that experience, the experience of my colleague, the hon. member for Greenwood, during the war before the internee appeal tribunals, and on the basis of experiences that I could cite to him for the next several hours, this kind of procedure is of value. It does not give the appellant the normal rights of a hearing, but we agree with the minister that these are abnormal circumstances and that normal rights cannot apply. We merely plead with the minister to apply that abnormal right which, however, would adequately protect the security of Canada and would give the person concerned a chance to be heard and to make his case. This is what this amendment is about.

When the minister says to me, as he did the other day, that he knows I would not be satisfied with this information, I say to him that at least I would know the limits of the information I can receive, if this amendment is adopted, and whether I like it or not would make no more difference than under the minister's proposal which would provide me with no information at all. However, I hope to be a member of parliament for a good many years and therefore I will not be acting in these cases, but if I did I would know what the law says.

What is the virtue of denying me all information and making me incapable of doing anything at all as against giving me some information on which I may be able to do something? I cannot follow the minister's logic. My hon. friend suggests that perhaps there is none. However, I do not follow the logic that it is better to give no information than some information. As far as this amendment is concerned, I suppose that if the minister gave a certain amount of information he could still argue that in the circumstances of the case this was all he could give.

Let me point out to him again, because I am certain he has not read the amendment carefully, that what this amendment says is not that he must give information to the appellant in every case but that the board may direct that the minister shall furnish particulars to the board and the appellant. Therefore he can argue with the board as to precisely what particulars should be given. Under this amendment he will have a great deal of leeway to control the situation with respect to the extent of information which it