

Syndicate on the railway lands, there becoming due thereafter to it on the same sales, \$8,580,000, making an aggregate of \$19,580,000 actually got in in part and in part due and bearing interest, while the Government having the outer belt only of the railway lands, for their proportion of sales, on an equal area receives only \$3,863,000 within the ten years. It loses \$930,000, the cost of the surveys on the whole belt and of management, receiving a net amount, if it comes in, of \$2,933,000, and to come due thereafter \$2,942,000, an aggregate of \$5,875,000. But that, of course, is not all, according to the calculations of hon. gentlemen opposite, that Government will receive, because we have yet to deal with the homestead fees and pre-emptions, from which Government expected the large sum of \$10,621,000; from which deduct \$1,200,000 as half the expense of surveys and management, and you have a net amount of \$9,421,000 to come in, and \$9,590,000 to come due thereafter, or a total of \$19,000,000 net from homesteads and pre-emptions to accrue to the Government. The sum from railway lands and pre-emptions coming in within ten years is, therefore, \$12,350,000. But \$12,350,000 net is not near enough to pay the interest on current expenditure. So, adopting the calculations of the hon. gentlemen opposite, and confining them to the bargain, the Syndicate will have realized out of its lands, selling only as much as the Government expect, some \$11,000,000, and have some \$8,500,000 due. They will have been practically able to pay off the whole amount out of 5,400,000 acres necessary to build the railway, in addition to what they have got from the country, while the Government, for its \$60,000,000, will have got in a sum that will not nearly pay the interest on those \$60,000,000, leaving the whole of its capital account untouched. Do you tell me you will get more for your lands, that your prospects are brighter, that you may expect more than the figures I have given? Tell me how much more you will get, and then we will calculate how much more the Syndicate will receive. Because, if you get very much more than your own figures show, it follows that the Syndicate, the owners of the railway, the owners of the choicest lands, and possessing those energies and powers for which the Minister of Railways has given them so much credit, will get very much more proportionately, than you; and, therefore, if you double the figures for what you will receive, you may more than double them for the Syndicate's returns, and show that, in ten years, they will not merely have built the railway without extra outlay, but have more than doubled their receipts from the lands. Do you tell me that I value the Syndicate's gains too high? It is not my estimate, it is yours. Do you tell me your estimates are erroneous, are too high for *their* lands? How much less, then, may we expect for *your* lands. If they must expect less for theirs, you must expect less for yours—less than the paltry sum which you have estimated, and so much the worse for the country which will receive little relief from the sale of its lands—not even a fraction of the interest on the capital expenditure to which I have referred. By the old plan, if we built the railway we had it. By the new, we are to pay for it handsomely, with a very large bonus to the builders, and then they are to own it. The heaviest sections are to be built by us. Hon. gentlemen opposite talk of finality. Do we know absolutely what our obligations are? They say that one of the great advantages of this business is, that if the expenditure by the country is large, at any rate we know the limit. Well, what was the indeterminate character of the business before? It was that we did not know how much it would cost us to construct the railway. But we are now going to construct a large portion of the railway. We are not limiting ourselves to those very expensive portions under

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contract, but are undertaking a new piece, and, for ten years to come, we shall be still building on the Canadian Pacific Railway, and the indeterminate character of the transaction in this particular will remain; and, unless we are fortunate enough to possess during all that time a Minister of Railways able to bring down annually decreasing estimates of the cost of the work to be performed, we shall experience no little anxiety in regard to the public obligations and prospects. It is obvious, from the estimates of the Minister of Railways, that the situation under him is not quite so alarming, but still it is tolerably alarming, with regard to the want of finality. If I were, however, a supporter of his Government I would venture to suggest the exercise of that admirable diminishing faculty of his to relieve the question from these serious considerations. It could not be a subject of uneasiness to us that our obligations were indeterminate when all that we had to do was, on coming to Parliament, to learn how much less the railway was going to cost this year than the estimate of the year before. However great the cost of the British Columbia section, we have to build it, from Kamloops to Port Moody; and as to the finality, otherwise, what is the extent of it? There has been a great deal said as to the financial capacity of the capitalists who are to build this road. The hon. Minister of Railways himself alluded to it in vigorous terms, the other day, pointing out that it afforded a perfect security to the country. From what I observe, then, I conclude that these gentlemen, having some money to risk, are quite determined that if there is to be any question of finality in this business, it should be settled on their side. In the terms of this contract is a special provision that it shall not go into operation unless there is an Act of incorporation, and that the contract is to belong to the corporation, and that the individual contractors are not to be liable. We have got the seal as our security, with the deposit. Well, the hon. gentleman declared, with his happy faculty of making the best of all unhappy circumstances, that, upon the whole, he thought it would be a very much better thing that there should be no security at all; whereon, I suggest that it might be a good thing to allow the Syndicate to amend their bargain, by striking out that deleterious provision as to the security of the \$1,000,000. If it is bad to have any security, why should the Government prove such traitors to the country, as to insert the security clause? But, if it is good to require that security, let us remember that it is all we have. We have not even the individual security of those gentlemen. We have not the personal responsibility of these gentlemen,—we have nothing at all except the million. Well, now, if security is wanted, that security is inadequate; security will only be wanted on such an enterprise as this, if all the calculations of the Government, all these figures of theirs which I have now been developing, turn out wholly fallacious; if this enterprise becomes entirely disastrous—if there is an utter collapse of some kind or other; and if there is, it is not a million, Sir, that will stop that gap. Extraordinary, Mr. Chairman, as the whole price is, its distribution between the sections is still more remarkable. The prairie region, nine hundred miles, is the eastern part of the central section. One thousand miles of that region was, last year, estimated at \$13,000 a mile, which would be, for the 900 miles that I am now considering, and which have been defined by the contract, \$11,700,000. But that would be an over-estimate of the cost of 900 miles, because the western 100 miles which has been lopped off from the 1,000 miles and assigned to the western end of the central section, is confessedly much heavier. It belongs to the mountain region, and, I suppose, that is one of the reasons why that different disposition and division was made. Well, of course, if you take an extremely heavy 100 miles from the 1,000 which