

to do this, I think the ideal situation would have been to vote positively on the Albanian resolution at the United Nations last November and say, at the same time, this constitutes an act of diplomatic recognition, but I think it can be announced. The Chinese may not accept it; they may ignore it. I do not think it involves any discussion with the Chinese over Taiwan. That is another red herring.

Mr. BREWIN: If they do ignore it we should continue to leave the proposal open so far as we are concerned.

Mr. TAYLOR: Yes, I think we should recognize; I may be knocked down by some of the people who are more familiar with diplomatic subtleties but I can see no obvious reason why we cannot simply unilaterally recognize, and then if the Chinese want to discuss the exchange of diplomatic missions, fine, but make no commitment about the status of Taiwan at the same time. Say nothing about Taiwan.

Mr. BREWIN: I have one more question and I do not know whether you have looked into this particularly. I think some people are of the view that the concentration of Chinese industrial effort on the development of a thermonuclear capacity indicates an aggressive rather than a defensive outlook and constitutes a threat to the Western world which we should be prepared to meet. Do you have any comment on that?

Mr. TAYLOR: Yes, sir, I do. I do not like the thought of anybody entering the nuclear arms race, whatever side they are on or whatever their policies are, but I think the Chinese bomb is defensive. I think, from a Chinese point of view, it was a responsible act on the part of the Chinese government. The best defence I have ever heard of the Chinese bomb came from a French diplomat. I think there are very direct and interesting parallels between DeGaulle's attitude on the bomb and national sovereignty and Chinese attitudes, I think the Chinese, felt, rightly or wrongly that they were in a situation where the two super powers of the world were, in effect, their enemies. You can say they need not have placed themselves in this situation and that is an argument I would accept, but the fact is they are in this situation and I think in this situation they felt they were menaced and that the bomb provides a deterrent, not an effective nuclear striking force. It is not for some time going to represent an effective nuclear striking force, and I doubt very much that they would ever launch a first strike.

Mr. WALKER: A status symbol?

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Chairman, I would like to continue indefinitely but I will give way to someone else.

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: Thank you Mr. Brewin. I have to sandwich a brief question in occasionally between others. You mentioned that Mao feared the youth of the country. Why, then, did he turn loose the Red Guards?

Mr. TAYLOR: The Red Guards, as far as we know, represent about 20 million young Chinese which is not the total youthful population of that age by any means. These are the most highly politically articulate; the most highly indoctrinated; the liveliest of the young Chinese, and in our society they would be the people who would be marching outside the American Consulate and/or the