

moment that obligation faces us, although we do not know where that obligation will face us in the weeks ahead. Almost from the beginning, of course, the United States forces have been supported by naval and air force detachments contributed by other members of the United Nations, including Canada.

This special force is unique in one way among the offers of military forces which have been made to the United Nations as the result of the war in Korea; and provides, I think, a valuable example and precedent. If other countries were, in the same way, to earmark a portion of their forces which might be made available to the United Nations for collective defence, there would be ready throughout the free world national contingents for a United Nations force which could be quickly brought together in the face of a future emergency. In this way the United Nations would be equipped with that military strength which it was intended in the Charter that it should have at its disposal but which, in fact, it never has had, largely because of the attitude of the U.S.S.R.

The government's decision to ask that this special brigade should be made available, not only for service in Korea but more generally to discharge our responsibility for collective defence under the United Nations Charter or the North Atlantic Treaty, was dictated, I think, by an appreciation of the fact that the attack on Korea may be followed by communist-inspired attacks elsewhere. Already apprehension is felt in Iran, in Greece, in Austria and in Indo-China--places where, in the view of the Politburo, the circumstances might seem to be propitious for another armed attack.

Above all I suggest that we should not overlook the possibility that what has occurred in Korea might be repeated on a larger scale in Germany. The conditions of those two countries, superficially contrasting, offer some striking parallels at the present time. Both are cut in two by an artificial line of division; in both countries the Soviet-dominated section has powerfully equipped armed forces; while the other section is comparatively unarmed and open to attack. It is, I think, becoming increasingly obvious that the disparity between the military forces of Eastern and Western Germany must be redressed. It is no longer a question of whether or not Germany is to be rearmed, because the communist part of Germany has already been rearmed, and by Soviet Russia which controls it. If Western Germany therefore is to be defended--and certainly that defence is important to the defence of Western Europe--it must be given arms with which to assist in its own defence, or alternatively, other western countries must assume even heavier responsibilities than they have hitherto contemplated. There are of course risks entailed in rearming Western Germany. By grim experience we know that Germans with arms in their hands can be dangerous; but that risk already exists in Eastern Germany, and I think it will be minimized in Western Germany if that part of Germany, and eventually all of free democratic Germany, could be increasingly and effectively integrated economically, militarily and ultimately politically with the other countries of Western Europe. That way, I think, lies the road to safety. But that process of course will raise problems in its turn. And yet I cannot help but feel that that policy alone provides safeguards against the dangers involved in allowing Western Germany to rearm, apart from Western Europe, or even the more dangerous position of allowing her to remain defenceless against a Russian armed and controlled Eastern Germany.