

situation, determine the requirements for US security assistance, and work with the Salvadoran High Command to develop a comprehensive strategy. (Downie, 1998:132)

Originally, the goal was to draft a comprehensive political, military and economic plan. However, all of the limited time and resources were used to develop a national military strategy. Without any background research prior to arriving in the country, nor any knowledge of El Salvador's established political objectives, the Team made many assumptions, and created a report that focused primarily on military concerns. The report did not address other facets of counterinsurgency dealing with social and economic reforms, reinforcement of democratic institutions, or the improvement of government services and civic action. It focused primarily on fighting the insurgency. (Downie, 1998:132) In the end, this report served as a blueprint for US military security assistance effort to equip, train and modernize the El Salvadoran Armed Force (ESAF) for five years. (Downie, 1998:133)

Two weeks after his inauguration in 1984, Duarte admitted in an interview:

Aid is given under such conditions that its use is really decided by the Americans and not by us. Decisions like how many planes or helicopters we buy, how we spend our money... all of that... is decided by the ones who gives the money. And all of the money is spent over there. We never even see a penny of it, because everything arrives here already paid for. (Duarte cited in Fish, 1988:20)

This statement demonstrates that the El Salvadoran government and military were not the only ones responsible for the institutionalization of fear. Without foreign assistance and *guidance* from the United States, one must question how long the civil war would have lasted, to what extent the violence would have diminished, and whether warring parties might have initiated a resolution sooner.

From 1985 to 1989, there was a period of sustained stalemate in the battlefield. Ongoing cases of human rights violations eventually changed US policy towards El Salvador, and it finally become a top priority issue. Yet, the ESAF continued to commit violations despite US military assistance, aid, and pressure to reform. (Downie, 1998:140) With the prospects of revolution diminishing, the guerrillas began to propose a negotiated settlement to the conflict. However, the Reagan Administration refused to allow its allies to engage in the negotiations. An outright military defeat of FDR-FMLN was the only acceptable goal the US would back. With the US and Salvadoran military still envisioning the possibility of winning the war, the option of negotiation never materialized. (Munck, 1995: 169)

Military aid dropped during the Bush Administration. The murder of four Jesuit priests in 1989 prompted the Administration to threaten to cut off its military assistance, due to the