

## Part III

### Application of the Sinai Model Elsewhere

#### 1. Potential Candidates for the Sinai Model

In a speech before the first United Nations Special Session on Disarmament in 1978, US Vice-President Walter Mondale noted:

Our experience in the Middle East has demonstrated that technical assistance with monitoring systems such as aerial photography and ground detection devices can help create the confidence necessary to make disengagement and stabilizing agreements work.

In his speech, Mondale suggested that the basic operational concepts utilized by the SFM could be applied to other conflict-prone borders.

The success of the verification system in the Sinai gives rise to the question: On what other borders in the Middle East or in other regions could such a system monitor compliance with agreements between adversaries involved in the process of restructuring their security relationship? Clearly there are a number of conflict-prone borders that could benefit from such a third-party-assisted multimethod verification system.

In the Middle East there are a number of settings where a modified version of the Sinai model might be usefully applied and have some prospect of improving the security relationship between regional adversaries. The Sinai case-study indicates that the model is most likely to be successful when (A) only two parties are involved and other actors can be prevented from interfering with the process of improving risk management, (B) there is a commitment to developing a political and military framework for an agreement, and (C) third parties are prepared — by providing technical expertise and financial support — to facilitate the process of disengagement and assist in verifying any new agreement.

Before examining potential Middle East candidates, however, two important qualifications must be introduced. First, the successful applica-

tion of the Sinai model is conditional upon an initial commitment by the parties to develop a political and military framework for an agreement that would restructure their security relationship. At present, indicators pointing favourably towards conflict resolution are virtually non-existent (particularly in the case of Iran and Iraq). Second, while the verification system in the Sinai was simply part of a transition toward a more institutionalized peace-building relationship, supported by more traditional methods of peacekeeping, the early warning and verification procedures suggested in the cases following will likely come to form a permanent feature of the evolving security relationship between the adversaries.

#### Case 1

BORDER/REGION: Golan Heights

PARTIES: Israel, Syria

POTENTIAL VERIFICATION REGIME:

- National Means
- Immediate Third-Party-Assisted
- Bilateral/Mediated
- Consultative Mechanism

Despite important differences in terrain, a history of extreme animosity and the strategic sensitivity of the Golan to both parties, it is possible to conceive of a "next step" negotiation on the Golan similar to the second interim Agreement (Sinai II) between Egypt and Israel. In extending the formula of "less than total withdrawal for less than total peace", Israel would vacate a portion of the Golan Heights (probably Mount Hermon and the adjoining territory) which would subsequently be demilitarized with the flanking zones on both the Israeli and Syrian sides subject to restrictions on manpower and weapons.<sup>41</sup> This extended disengagement system would be monitored and verified

<sup>41</sup> Nathan A. Pelcovits, *Peacekeeping on Arab-Israeli Fronts: Lessons from the Sinai and Lebanon*, SALS Papers No. 3. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), p. 95.

