source base in the region. These ex-Portuguese colonies are multiracial and avowedly socialist states, and Pretoria is determined that they will not flourish.

SADCC has succeeded in improving collective economic security through closer co-operation, beginning the move towards integration of its economies and markets, and providing a rallying point for greater self-reliance. It has not, however, significantly reduced economic dependence on South Africa. In the first five years of its existence, South Africa's destruction of transport routes raised the proportion of trade of the six landlocked countries which passes through the Republic from 50 to 85 percent. Zimbabwean trade transported through Mozambique fell from 54 percent in 1983 to under 10 percent in 1987.

Not surprisingly, security has become a major preoccupation for the SADCC countries. The defence budgets of Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe were 50 percent, 42 percent and 16 percent respectively of government spending in 1986. The South African Defence Force is a formidable opponent which has struck as far north as Lusaka and Cabinda and is fighting a large conventional campaign inside Angola - actions over two thousand kilometers north of its borders. Seven of the nine SADCC capitals, and some of the most important SADCC infrastructure - the Beira corridor, the Luanda oil refinery, Maputo port - have been attacked by South African special forces.

SADCC representatives have raised the issue of non-lethal military assistance on two separate occasions in Canada. Last November, the Executive Secretary of SADCC, Simba Makoni, pointed out that it is in the interests of countries funding SADCC projects to help protect their investments. "We're not talking about Canadian forces defending the Beira corridor," he stated. "No bullets. No rifles. But there's a need for support – uniforms for troops, food."

This appeal has not met with a positive response from the Canadian government, despite expectations that a Commonwealth plan

for military aid might emerge following the Summit in Vancouver last October. At that time, Commonwealth Secretary General, Shridath Ramphal, seemed to be urging a more active Commonwealth role by calling for help with helicopter surveillance and communications equipment for the key Beira corridor. At the recent SADCC meeting in Tanzania, Mr. Clark turned down a request from Mozambique for help in defending the rail lines, some of which are funded by Canada.

The call for military aid has practical significance, particularly in Mozambique. The Mozambican army is poorly equipped and lacks food and other essential supplies. There are already thousands of troops from Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Malawi deployed in Mozambique. Britain is providing military training for the Mozambican army and has supplied rifles and night sights to Mozambique.

CANADIAN POLICY HAS TRADItionally disavowed military aid in the developing world, and the mandate of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) specifically excludes it. In the past forty years decolonization has created a new world of nations, but military growth in the Third World has seemingly been an instrument to repress development, drain national treasuries and transform the Third World into an arena for dozens of wars. The argument that military aid exacerbates underdevelopment rather than resolving it is generally persuasive. Military aid to the countries hardest hit by South African aggression, however, has special relevance in a situation in which development projects – clinics, factories, dams and railroads – are the specific targets of destruction.

Canada's position on this question is not yet finalized. Most Canadians would be hesitant about Canada taking a major role in the provision of military aid, or allowing this issue to dominate Canadian policy efforts in the region. Logic, however, requires that Canadian assistance recognize the legitimacy of self-defence and take account of the security needs of aid programmes. For example, the Mozambican emergency aid programme has lost 200 supply trucks in the past six months; armour plating and radio equipment for these civilian trucks is needed to increase protection. Such examples demonstrate that if aid is to proceed, donors need to adopt a pragmatic attitude to helping with the costs of security. There is a precedent of Canadian military aid to Tanzania during the 1960s, and funding for training of army officers from Commonwealth SADCC countries which continues.

Whatever the government de-

cides, military aid is at best a limited response to South African aggression, although it has great symbolic significance. The Frontline States have repeatedly made the point that the only way to sustain development and end conflict throughout the region is to eliminate apartheid. Their defence cannot rely solely on arms, because they cannot match the military power of South Africa in the foreseeable future. In this context the most vital security assistance which the outside world can provide the Frontline States is to restrain Pretoria and accelerate the achievement of majority rule. Robert Mugabe underlined this point on the eve of the Vancouver Summit by putting the issue into sharp relief: "If we get rid of apartheid then our other headaches will also go - we must not only restrain the hand that is destroying the bridges, but, if we can, we must reverse the whole process."

THE NEW-FOUND SIGNIFICANCE OF Canada in international diplomacy opens up additional avenues for putting pressure on South Africa to change its ways, and help maintain the stability of the Frontline States in the meantime. Of these, sanctions remain the most important. To date Canadian sanctions have eliminated about 25 percent of total trade between the two countries. At the Commonwealth Summit, the government made it clear that it believes sanctions are effective as a means of pressure. Although it is not likely that current governments in Britain and the US will accept sanctions, Canada should now proceed with the commitment made by the Prime Minister at the UN in 1985 to sever all economic and political ties if South Africa did not move to dismantle apartheid.

South Africa has answered this call for reform with greater repression. If Canada now reneges on its commitments it will strengthen the view of those white South Africans who believe that violence can be used to maintain the status quo. The demonstration effect – to South Africans, to western countries, as well as to our friends in the region – is now the most important dimension of Canadian policy.

