of key adversary capabilities and activities. In addition, non-interference is an indicator of non-hostile and, perhaps more important, cooperative intent. This measure elevates the acquisition of misperception-reducing information to an explicitly cooperative or joint enterprise.

(3) Behavioural or Tension Reducing Measures (designed to constrain the risks of unintended war or crisis escalation by controlling or eliminating pointlessly aggressive or provocative "testing" behaviour).

These measures are very directly concerned with decision-making and perception. Their point is to ban or control activities that are likely to be misunderstood or, more specifically, ones likely to precipitate a crisis, thus avoiding the circumstances that might lead to an unintended war. These measures recognize the important role of misperception but do not really concern themselves so much with the acquisition of knowledge per se. They are more directly involved in preventing a train of events from getting underway. Thus, they are conceptually distinct from information and communication CBMs but share a degree of functional similarity with Deployment-Constraint Measures. In both cases, they attempt to directly control the problem-causing features of the international environment instead of simply trying to improve knowledge about them (although they do this too by structuring deployments according to established agreements).

(4) Deployment-Constraint Measures (the restrictions of certain specified types and/or numbers of military forces and/ or specified types and/or numbers of equipment in specified geographic zones regarded to be sensitive).

Deployment-Constraint Measures are aggressive CBMs that aim to *prevent* misunderstanding by avoiding (typically) the movement of anxiety-inducing equipment and/or troops into positions where they might be used for a surprise attack. They therefore seek to

control the environment in order to counter misunderstanding and misperception. By structuring the military relationship, these measures also facilitate the acquisition of improved knowledge about potential adversaries, knowledge which will presumably reduce the chances and dimensions of misperception.

(C) – Declaratory CBMs

This is a controversial category that is included primarily because a number of states claim that such measures are CBMs. Because the bulk of declaratory proposals appear to entail "atmospheric" rather than "technical" considerations, it could be argued that they are inherently psychological. The Western reaction to them is typically antagonistic because they do not usually contain "verifiable" features. Unlike the other type of Confidence-Building discussed here, there is no obvious information acquisition function associated with these measures. Their difference on this count underlies their basic incompatibility with other types of Confidence-Building Measures.

It should be quite clear from this brief summary (as well as from the earlier discussions) that Information and Communication CBMs as well as Constraint CBMs address problems of misperception and misunderstanding. (A plausible argument could be made to the effect that Declaratory CBMs also concentrate on problems of misperception but the method of addressing these broader political problems seems qualitatively different when compared with Information and Constraint CBMs.) The presumption (as noted in the Type One Generic Flaw) is that no Eastern or Western state actually intends to begin a conventional war in Europe. The concern is that a war might nevertheless begin (or relations continue to worsen until conflict became inevitable) as a consequence of some sort of miscalculation or basic misunderstanding - either crisis-related or longer-term. Confidence-Building Measures are therefore intended to "correct" - or, more realistically, help to correct - the suspicious, ethnocentric, over-reactive, and anxiety-inducing national security thinking of the states trapped in an enduring adversarial relationship. As was noted earlier, the pri115

