

allowed time for the French to retrieve their original colossal mistake of expecting the real invasion to come through Alsace-Lorraine, and the march through Belgium to be not much more than a demonstration of force.

The French strength was massed along the line from Verdun to Belfort, and but for the delay in Belgium could not have got to the Marne in time. Liege fell, but Paris still is Paris.

The other great mistake of Germany was in underrating the promptness with which England would act. Berlin was probably well aware that the violation of Belgium would be sure ultimately to bring England into the fray, but Berlin undoubtedly counted on England's muddling about for three weeks or a month before she entered the war, by which time all the fat would have been in the fire.

Britain Dislocated Plans.

One of the reasons for the present bitterness of German hate against the British lies in the fact that all the German plans were dislocated by the quickness of Great Britain's decision. The very attitude of Grey throughout the fateful days from the 23rd of July to the 2nd of August, when he was doing everything in his power to prevent war, probably made Germany all the more sure that he would be slow to enter his country in the war.

The petulant surprise of the German chancellor that Great Britain would undergo the pains of war for her treaty with Belgium, "for a scrap of paper," shows the German inability to understand that a country which uncompromisingly desired and sought peace would none the less unhesitatingly and immediately declare war where the honoring of treaty obligations required it.

This surprise at England's entering the war when she did show the insincerity of the present German claim that this war is one which Great Britain has forced upon Germany from jealousy of the growing German commerce. But then consistency has never been characteristic of the German State Department, as is shown by the six different

official explanations or excuses for the violation of Belgian neutrality, each one of them inconsistent with the others.

The German drive against Paris having been turned back at the critical moment when it appeared as if it would prove successful, and the armies forced back to the Aisne, they proceeded then to entrench themselves and to extend their lines until they reached from the Swiss border to the North Sea.

Tremendous efforts were put forth to advance to Calais and threaten England by holding one side of the channel at its narrowest point, and also to break through in the neighborhood of Soissons and St. Mihiel to renew the drive against Paris. These endeavors proved futile, and no material change in positions has taken place.

Austrian Power Broken.

Both sides have shown wonderful heroism and bravery, and the losses on both sides have been heavy. The Germans have suffered most, both because of their habit of charging in mass formation and because the offensive against entrenchments is always more costly than the defence. At the outset the German artillery held a marked superiority, but this seems to have been entirely overcome and the superiority now appears to be on the side of the Allies.

The marksmanship of the allied infantry has been from the beginning much superior, and in the matter of mobility the network of railways available for both sides has given neither any great advantage. The use of aeroplane scouts has prevented any great surprise by either, as movements of great bodies of troops cannot be concealed from the enemy.

In the Eastern theatre the changes have been much more spectacular than in the West. As a whole, it may be stated that the Austrian armies have proved far inferior to their adversaries, while there has been little to choose between the success of the Germans and the Russians. The one