

though it does not move a SALT II agreement closer to the first-rank measures.) In a third tier of priorities come reductions in the nuclear weapons of China, France and the UK, reductions in the level of conventional arms in both Eastern and Western Europe, a ban on all nuclear exports, and unilateral Western initiatives to begin reducing arms with the purpose of inducing reciprocal reductions by the USSR. Unilateral Western disarmament was not given any significant support.

These results suggest the group of Canadians surveyed here has a fairly clear set of priorities in the area of arms control and disarmament. To summarize, the problem of nuclear war is seen first and foremost as a problem arising from the nuclear arms race between the two superpowers. The apparent solution, therefore, is to stop and reverse the current buildup. Preventing or at least lessening the risk of a war by chemical weapons is, according to these Canadians, also a paramount concern. A general ban on chemical weaponry, to supplement the existing agreement which covers only the use, not the production of these weapons, is also sorely needed. Other arms control measures such as banning missile tests, reducing non-superpower nuclear arsenals, banning nuclear exports, and cutting conventional weapons, are for most respondents secondary but desirable. Unilateral disarmament is not favored at all. Even unilateral reductions aimed at inducing reciprocal Soviet reductions are not favored by many although they attract more support than simple unilateral initiatives.

Fault line shifts

Given the emphasis on superpower mutual arms reductions it is useful to look further at some additional relevant findings. Those surveyed were asked whether they thought the USSR, US, or both countries were holding up arms control and disarmament talks. Most (83%) say "both." Small minorities point to the USSR (13%) and US (3%) individually. A striking point here is that when this same question was asked of Canadians in the early 1960s, in a national survey by the Canadian Peace Research Institute, the results were much more in one direction. Then slightly less than half (47%) said "both" and almost as many (43%) pointed to the USSR alone. (A follow up question as to who was more responsible for the holdup asked of those who responded "both" produced parallel results in 1962 and 1982; in that survey approximately 40%-45% pointed to the USSR while the same number insisted it was "both equally.")

The results from a related question reinforce the recent tendency to apportion the blame for the lack of progress in talks. Respondents to the CIIA survey were also asked whether they thought Soviet and American leaders genuinely wanted disarmament. With respect to the USSR, 57% say no, 21% say yes, and another 21% indicate they do not know. With respect to the US the results were surprisingly close: 64% no, 20% yes, and 15% don't know. Thus about as many doubt American leaders' interest in disarmament as doubt that of Soviet leaders. Again these results regarding the US stand in marked contrast to those obtained in the 1962 poll. Then only 29% of the Canadians surveyed believed American leaders did not want disarmament and fully 60% thought they did.

To the extent these two surveys are generalizable and

comparable, they suggest substantial numbers of Canadians may in the last two decades have changed their views of both superpowers at least as regards arms control and disarmament. In the late 1960s and early 1970s period of East-West détente, perhaps not surprisingly, there appears to have been fostered a greater public acceptance of the need to deal with the communist world as represented by the USSR, or, in short, of the need for co-existence. This change is most evident in the 1962 and 1982 surveys' results on two further questions. In the former poll, 27% agreed with the statement that "no disarmament agreement should be signed with Russia as long as it remains Communist," while 65% disagreed. In the current survey, only 6% agreed with the same statement and 93% disagreed. The fact that one adviser to President Reagan has been quoted expressing views very close to this statement suggest a substantial gap between these Canadians and the current US administration.

The notion that "the West should take all steps to defeat Communism, even if it means risking nuclear war," found agreement with 42% in 1962 while a slightly larger percentage disagreed. In contrast, only 6% in the recent survey agreed with the same statement and 94% disagreed. Even allowing for the fact that the 1962 survey was conducted in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis, and may have captured for some a particularly hawkish mood, the

POSSIBLE INTERNATIONAL ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT MEASURES

	Ranked as a highest priority by (%)
Reduction in US and USSR nuclear weapons	60
General ban on chemical weapons	55
New SALT II treaty	33
Reduction in conventional weapons trade to Third World	33
Ban on testing of new missile systems	30
General and complete disarmament via the UN	27
Reduction in national military budgets	25
Reduction of conventional arms in Europe	19
Reduction in nuclear weapons of China, UK and France	19
Unilateral arms reductions to induce reciprocal reductions	16
Ban on all nuclear exports	15
Unilateral Western disarmament	2

TABLE 2

shift in these attitudes toward the USSR seems significant. It might be noted however that not all attitudes have changed; the proportions approving and disapproving of unilateral Western disarmament, for example, are virtually identical in the two surveys.

An equally if not more significant shift appears to have taken place in attitudes toward the United States. As observed above those surveyed in recent months seem much more skeptical than did Canadians in the 1960s about claims that it is Soviet intransigence which is responsible for the lack of progress in negotiating arms control and