

to attaining them alone would be to cultivate our own interdependence as members of NATO without realizing that the health and strength of the Alliance depends on its relations with the world outside. There is, in other words, a global interdependence in this age of scientific discovery and nationalist ferment, and it is important for us and important for NATO not to underestimate that need.

No one should think of letting down his guard at the present time; no prudent man can deny the need for defence insurance. What I am suggesting is that the security organization will be successful or unsuccessful according to the degree of intelligence with which its political policies are formulated and pursued.

To give an example, I turn for a moment to the problem of (Soviet activity in) uncommitted neutral states. This is a serious and growing danger. How are they going? Are they going toward the Russians or towards the West? This cannot be ignored by NATO members, and yet NATO as such is perhaps not well equipped to deal with such a problem. . . . The Asian and African nations which are uncommitted have no more desire than we have to see greater domination of other countries by the U.S.S.R. But, having regard to the historic relations they have had with the West and having regard to their desire to flex their muscles as new and independent nations, they might think that the steps which are being taken at NATO are designed for our security, and of course they are, and they would not necessarily adopt them wholeheartedly as their measures.

We must recognize, too, that nationalism is not necessarily synonymous with communism in young countries, but we have to realize also that nationalism has been exploited by communism. There are real risks in dealing with these uncommitted nations. Their peoples may succumb to the blandishments and to the plausible and insidious appeal of Soviet tactics, but we must respect them as independent nations. We must work with them and assure them that we regard them as independent nations, and try to establish a mature and wise relationship with them. Or, to put it another way, unless we assure them by word and deed that our participation in NATO is complementary to and not in conflict with our membership in the Commonwealth and in the United Nations we may not be able to make much appeal to them.

Canada is a middle power with roots in the three associations, in NATO, in the Commonwealth and in the United Nations. I think Canada has a special reason for avoiding an absolutely rigid dependence on any one of these organizations as the sole instrument or channel of its foreign policy.

I come now to my final point in relation to the NATO meeting projected for Paris in December. The House will not expect me — and even if it did I could not do this — to predict the specific terms of the agenda or the likely outcome of the deliberations. I am more concerned to suggest to this House the general philosophy which I think should govern our approach to that meeting. We must . . . start from the premise that new and intensified efforts at military and scientific co-operation are essential, and we must be prepared to do our part in developing that co-operation. We must, in the second place, in view of the unhappy events of the last two or three weeks, renew our determination to consult frankly on issues which have caused, or are likely to cause divisions in NATO. And, thirdly, to return to the point I was trying to make