

(d) verification. He is still thinking of devising some middle-of-road formula which would enable two sides to move from their present incompatible positions. I suggested that maybe non-aligned could best exercise influence, not repeat not by putting forward a definite plan, but instead, suggestions as to principles and methods of work in order to break deadlock in these areas, and later intervene to keep things moving in negotiations between two sides. Whether he takes this suggestion or not repeat not, it seems likely that India will be active in trying to promote a compromise of some sort in forthcoming UNGA.

4. Lall remarked that reports of latest Pugwash Meeting (held in Cambridge last month) were interesting in that members of Conference which included many top level scientists from both East and West gave indications of ways in which compromises could be reached both in general disarmament, especially verification, and on a nuclear test cessation treaty. It would be desirable for Canadian delegation at 17th UNGA to have as full information about these reports as possible.²⁷

[E.L.M.] BURNS

42.

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*Le ministre de la Défense nationale
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Minister of National Defence
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

CONFIDENTIAL

[Ottawa], October 17, 1962

My dear Colleague:

Canada may find it necessary in the near future to take a stand on inspection in the nuclear test ban issue, now that the first Committee is in session.

There is a strong indication that a resolution will be tabled in the UN first Committee along the lines of the proposals made by Burma and India, calling on the nuclear powers to accept an uninspected moratorium on underground tests. The United States have made it quite clear that they will oppose any such resolution. However, it is equally clear that they will be subjected to increasing pressure to concede.

There would be grave risks to Western security in its acceptance. Responsible Western scientists are agreed that they cannot distinguish in all cases between earthquakes and underground explosions, by any known scientific means, and the Soviets have refused repeatedly to provide any evidence that they have this capability. There are possibilities that scientific identification might be possible at some future date, but the United States could not be expected to prejudice its security based on a mere possibility.

Whether a significant strategic advantage can be gained by clandestine testing cannot be stated precisely, but those who are competent to make an assessment agree that there is a

²⁷ Voir/ See *Problems of Disarmament and World Security: Proceedings of the Ninth Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, Cambridge, England, August 25-30, 1962* (London, UK: Pugwash Continuing Committee, 1962); *Papers and Reports of the Ninth Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs "Problems of Disarmament and World Security," Cambridge, England - August 25-30, 1962* (London: Pugwash Continuing Committee, 1962); *Scientists and World Affairs: Proceedings of the Tenth Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, London, England, September 3-7, 1962* (London: Pugwash Continuing Committee, 1962).