

*Supply—National Defence*

of course, for the United States is exactly as it should be, though I maintain that for Canada it may well mean our becoming a satellite of the United States. If this transpires I have no hesitation in saying that we will have no one to blame except ourselves.

We in Canada are now bound in many devious ways to both United States defence policy and United States foreign policy. It will become increasingly difficult for Canada to act in her own best interests on fundamental issues independent of the policies of the United States. Quite honestly, how could we be independent, because under NORAD, for all practical purposes at least, the R.C.A.F. in Canada is part of the U.S.A.F. This is important. If the United States is engaged in a war, Canada will be in it right from the start. Indeed, Mr. Chairman, we will probably be the battleground, if you can say there is a battleground in modern understanding and terminology. I say without hesitation it will be most difficult to remain unimplicated in any minor peripheral war in which the United States may become involved as a great power.

There are those who may ask—and it would sound as a logical question—is that bad? There are those who would say that surely nothing should be done to weaken the western alliance. There are those who would say that we should be tied very definitely and irrevocably with the United States. But, Mr. Chairman, I would say the answer to that would be, yes if the United States policies are absolutely correct at all times. But any one who is honest knows that the United States policies are not always perfect. There are many of us who have felt very often that they are illogical and indeed upon occasions I have no hesitation in saying that the United States policies have sometimes been dangerous.

Our interests in Canada, Mr. Chairman, are not, nor should they be, identical with those of the United States. Our desire to trade with China against United States objection is merely a small example of what I have in mind. But even if our own Canadian objectives, if our own Canadian interests were identical with those of the United States, we strongly feel that it would be wrong for us to accept such complete United States domination of and responsibility for our foreign and our defence policies.

In passing, may I point out that we do not elect the president and the congress of the United States; we do not have the slightest say in the development of their policies and we certainly have no say in the appointment of the United States secretary of state. For us in Canada to accept United

States policy without question and without participating in their foreign relations is as wrong, as far as this group is concerned, as it would have been for the 13 original American colonies to have continued to accept British responsibility for their fate without adequate representation. That spirit of responsibility which reflected itself in a demand for representation which led to the Boston tea party had, according to history, very much to recommend it. I most certainly agree with that kind of spirit and the kind of spirit which I hope, and we all hope in this group, is going to be expressed here in the course of this debate, that is to debate openly and perhaps if necessary with some passion, those matters of the most urgent public importance which have a bearing on the life of every citizen of our country.

We in this group insist that if we wish to retain our status as a sovereign nation, then we must develop and give effect to foreign and defence policies of our own. That, I think, was almost the keynote of the remarks of the Leader of the Opposition. We would like to emphasize it. If we wish to maintain our status as a sovereign nation then we must develop and give effect to foreign and defence policies of our own. We must determine what our true interests are and act accordingly. If in the outcome the United States is forced to make one of those agonizing reappraisals this time with regard to Canada, then so be it. If our Canadian foreign and defence policies are sound, we will be able to ride out any storm and in the end we will have established a new relationship with our southern neighbour, a relationship based on honour and on mutual respect.

We in this group have no hesitation whatsoever in saying that our military policy is designed, or it should be designed, to dispose of our military forces in a manner most likely to carry out the basic aims of our foreign policy. It should not be necessary for me to say that in no way whatsoever should the precepts of defence policy provide the basis of foreign policy. Defence—and this is something, sir, if we cannot get anything else over, we would like to get over—must be the logical extension of our own country's foreign policy, and the basic aim of this country's foreign policy at this point in our history at least must be the national survival in the broadest sense of that term.

The most obvious threat, from all we have heard and all we read, comes from the Soviet union, directly in a military sense, but as time goes on it will be more and more an economic offence which will affect