This Communist policy changes its outward forms and trappings according to circumstances and tactical requirements; but never its long-term aim, which is the complete overthrow of every form of society which is not based on revolutionary Marxism as interpreted and practiced and this is important - in Moscow. In seeking to achieve their aim, which is implicit in the Communist doctrine itsself, the architects of this world revolution do their best to exploit for their own purposes and to our disadvantage, two fears which understandably worry us these days: fear of Soviet strength, fear of the enemy in our midst.

There is, of course, a very real basis for each of these fears and it would be folly - and might mean disaster - to under-estimate them. But if we allow them to drive us into panic, and if we base our plans, domestically and internationally, on that panic, these fears can themselves become a danger almost as great as the grim reality behind them.

Let us take first the fear of Soviet strength and of aggression.

The danger of external aggression is very real. This the free world has recognized for some time and has acted collectively and with vigour - especially in NATO to meet it. While we were engaged in doing this by building a dyke against attack in Europe, the Communists launched a planned and calculated aggression in Korea; in an action which might be called "propaganda of the deed". It was essentially a deliberate act, designed to stun and to frighten off the nations of the free world and to bring about collapse through panic.

But contrary to the plans of the Kremlin, the Korean aggression inspired, not inaction through fear, but collective resistance to overcome the basis of that fear. The fear boomeranged against those who sought to crush us.

We learned that conquest was the fate of the weak and the isolated; not of the strong and the united. So we began to build up a powerful deterrent force in Europe, and to organize United Nations action against aggression in Korea, as our reply to this Communist military intimidation. If we do not yield to the temptation to rest on our oars, now that there has been some easing of international tension in parts of Europe, we need not doubt the success of this great collective defence effort by which Communist aggression and expansionism can be deterred, or, if it is attempted, defeated.

Fear, then, inspired by actual and threatened aggression has had good results in the field of collective defence. It has spurred us into action. Those results, however, will be changed for the worse if, because of this fear, we go too far in our defence plans and policies; if they become provocative militarily in Europe or in Asia and crippling economically. At the moment, however, this is certainly the lesser danger. The greater danger is that we may ease up and think that because no one committed all-out aggression in 1953 it won't happen in 1954 - 1955 - 1956.

The second attack by the forces of fear is on the home front. Here the problem is one which should neither be minimized nor exaggerated.