

article, the Canadian delegation believes, is too permissive. Any state could renounce its obligations that "if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country." It could denounce the treaty on what might be unfounded rumours or mere morbid suspicions, and would not have to justify its action in any international forum. The corresponding article in the USA draft (Art. VI, 1) obliges the party contemplating withdrawal to bring the matter to the attention of the Security Council--which could be expected to investigate thoroughly a situation which could have grave consequences for international peace and security.

Article VI, 2 in the USA draft treaty is intended to provide non-nuclear nations with the opportunity to review the operation of the treaty after a stated period of years. In addition to giving signatories a chance to review the provisions of the treaty in the light of actual experience, this portion of the USA draft treaty will also give the non-nuclear nations an opportunity to assess whether the nuclear powers have in fact achieved "effective agreements to halt the nuclear arms race, and to reduce armaments, including particularly nuclear arsenals," as the 4th preambular paragraph of the USA draft would have them declare. If there were no such progress, the non-nuclear nations could decide whether they wished to be bound any longer by the essentially one-sided obligations of the treaty.

The memorandum of the non-aligned members of the ENDC from which I quoted at the beginning of my remarks expressed the view that an agreement by non-nuclear nations not to make or acquire nuclear weapons would be inequitable unless steps are soon taken by the nuclear powers to limit and reduce the stocks of nuclear weapons and vehicles, with the purpose of finally eliminating them. This viewpoint was put more forcefully by the representative of the UAR at the 224th meeting of the ENDC when he said a non-dissemination treaty should not be "a mere instrument in which the non-nuclear powers would gladly renounce their rights to acquire nuclear weapons in order just to perpetuate the monopoly or the privileged position of the present five nuclear powers." (ENDC/224, p. 11) Canada agrees with these views.

On the other hand, we cannot agree with a more extreme suggestion which we have heard expressed, that is, that the nuclear powers have no right to ask the non-nuclear nations to abstain from developing a nuclear armoury, while they themselves retain nuclear weapons. Because of the increased risk of nuclear war opened up by the further spread of nuclear weapons, and the tremendous destructive