

involvement. Wassenaar does not have the 'teeth' to control arms exports."⁶⁶

As Freedman concludes "Most RMA-type technologies can neither be readily counted nor verified, and therefore do not fit into any of the traditional sorts of arms-control agreements." The problems of verification are compounded by the "civilianization of many important forms of collection and transmission." Only some of the "esoteric counter-measures and counter-counter measures may be kept from general release."⁶⁷

Presently, the United States is able to employ RMA technologies "to defeat most potential aggressors with disproportionately low casualties to itself, at least, in cases of interstate conflict of the type that directly affects its core national interests."⁶⁸ Yet the technologies associated with the RMA could be adapted by powers "that fear U.S. military intervention" and want to find the means to deter or counter it.⁶⁹ Because of the wide availability of at least some of the technologies, the RMA may well create "pockets of military capability" that will allow small states to frustrate the attacks of larger ones with overall more sophisticated militaries. Certain "microsystems" such as cruise missiles can inflict damage on aircraft carriers, while attacks on computer systems could hamper the transmission of information.⁷⁰ As Krepinevich points out,

"...the growing threats posed by cruise and anti-ship missiles and ballistic missiles, advanced satellite technologies for communication that are available to any paying customer, sea mines and advance diesel submarines, physical and electronic vulnerabilities of information and communications systems on which the U.S. armed forces increasingly depend, and the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons..could make it much harder for the United States to reach foreign ports safely, keep those ports as well as airfields and other infrastructure safe from enemy attack, and protect its troops on the battlefield."⁷¹

As the technology spreads, it would come to benefit smaller and regional powers more than the United States. Indeed, continued development may "be more likely to erode U.S. superiority than shore it up." John Arquilla of the Rand, argues that, "American military power lies so far beyond its nearest competitors today that it seems senseless to pursue the latest technological advances--especially as their introduction will no doubt lead to the erosion of existing advantages through

⁶⁶ Keller and Nolan, "The Arms Trade," p. 123.

⁶⁷ Freedman, *The Revolution in Strategic Affairs*, p. 71.

⁶⁸ Michael O'Hanlon, "Beware the 'RMA'nia'," <www.brook.edu/views/articles/ohanlon/1998/ndu.htm>, p. 7.

⁶⁹ Gongora and Riekhoff, "Introduction," p. 18.

⁷⁰ Cohen, "A Revolution in Warfare", p. 53.

⁷¹ O'Hanlon, "Beware the 'RMA'nia'," p. 8.