

which would require good cooperation from all sides, would be to decide during the peace negotiations what the minimum requirement for surrender of weapons would be before a reward system was implemented. Collective assistance bonuses could be provided for certain bench marks over that number. Penalties may also be incorporated within the terms of the peace agreement by stating that after a certain date anyone possessing a firearm who is not authorized to do so will be subject to certain penalties by the state. Presumably this would be after an election to ensure even application.

Although anathema to some, good intelligence will go a long way to contributing to disarmament compliance. An intelligence component to a UN Mission would prove useful.⁵⁵ It might also be advantageous building into a peace agreement and mandate the right to inspect certain areas or installations much as is done in both the CFE Treaty and Vienna Document.⁵⁶ If properly addressed this might overcome the tendency to refuse the UN access to certain areas as has been done on previous UN missions which in turn might encourage more openness on the part of belligerents.

These recommendations are by no means complete. But they do highlight some of the more important considerations if micro-disarmament is to be an effective component of UN peace operations. Study beyond this point is really the purview of those responsible for negotiating, funding and mounting UN peace operations. To this end several suggestions may be considered. With regards to brokering peace agreements upon which a mandate is formed, perhaps former UN negotiators could be consulted or assembled and either through written submissions or preferably through attendance at a workshop provide input into working guidelines on issues of micro-disarmament for negotiation purposes. The production of such guidelines could be done by the UN Secretariat or an ad hoc group established for that purpose. Concurrently or afterwards, guidelines or operating procedures for UN peace missions on implementing micro-disarmament could be developed. Again this would necessitate consulting or assembling relevant former commanders and staff that were involved in previous micro-disarmament missions. As well, military verification personnel from states involved in the CFE Treaty could provide useful input. Such an operational study and guideline could be done by the UN DPKO staff, an ad hoc panel or perhaps an institution such as the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre.

⁵⁵ See Andrei Raevsky *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Aspects of Psychological and Intelligence*. UNIDIR/96/31 UN New York, 1996

⁵⁶ The Vienna Document, a confidence and security building agreement involving the member states of the OSCE, permits inspections of specified areas. The CFE Treaty permits verification inspections of military installations to ensure Treaty compliance.