
on local initiatives. Technically-perfect solutions devised by outside actors will only serve to work against these local advances.

SESSION IV: ENACTING RECONSTRUCTION

The difficulties and challenges posed by the need to close the gap between analysis and timely policy responses were illustrated once again with reference to the recent case of Rwanda. This was a clear case of policy failure on the part of the international community. The window of opportunity which existed after the signing of the Arusha Accords and before President Habyarimana's plane was shot down (from 4 August 1993 to 5 April 1994), was lost due to a combination of inadequate resources and international inaction. The lack of coordination between government agencies, and between governments and the UN was cited as a particular problem that persists to this day.

Although the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) initiated and brokered the peace process, it was later sidelined by the intervention of the UN. The politics of the international community, rather than the local need for human security, became the determining factor in the UN response. Once large-scale violence began to break out again, the lack of coordination among the different levels of decision-making meant that the little external aid provided arrived *after* the genocide had taken place. In short, intelligence collected at the field level (by UNAMIR among others) was not acted upon, and there was no clear mandate for a coordinated response.

This case demonstrates that for post-conflict reconstruction to be successful, the international donor community must take the responsibility to do what is called for (in this case by the conflict actors themselves) when this assistance is needed. An *integrated and effective response* based on *informed analysis* is the key. The window of opportunity, during which conflict actors are committed to implementing a negotiated peace agreement and evolving a democratic political system, is too brief for time to be lost due to lack of coordination. In Rwanda, the parties to the Arusha Accords lobbied the UN together for a stronger UN force to secure internal stability and ensure civilian security. Instead, UNAMIR was pulled out when it faced the serious threat of organised internal violence, the very problem it was intended to deter. Such errors in the enacting of peace-building led one participant to suggest that such multilateral action cannot be successfully pursued through the UN. However, it was also noted that the UN role in supporting peace in Haiti has been considerably more positive and effective.