

2. A verification and compliance system under the Chemical Weapons Convention may be viewed as having three stages:
 - i. Data Collection -- objective information is gathered by on-site inspections and other means and is channeled to the evaluating body; provisions could be included to make clear that any obstruction of a legitimate verification exercise would be considered as non-compliance with the convention, and such acts would be published by the Executive Council as such.
 - ii. Data Analysis and Evaluation -- impartial consideration within the verification agency is necessary before deciding on the difference between an anomaly and clear non-compliance. Anomalies need explanation from the suspected party; non-compliance requires a formalized set of responses by the international community.
 - iii. Response -- periodic reporting on the presence or absence of anomalies is a basic requirement. More study is required into possible responses to acts of non-compliance -- for example, punishments such as sanctions or withdrawal of benefits, legal measures, and the like.
3. Under the Chemical Weapons Convention, there is the potential problem that, if the requisite number of ratifications is high -- for instance, sixty -- it may be some time before the treaty enters into force and the application of verification measures for all States Parties may begin. One possible solution is to include a paragraph in the Convention by which ratifying states may declare that the Convention enters into force for them as soon as ten, or fifteen, other states have made the same declaration.

On the basis of such entry into force, for a more limited number of states, a verification organ including a small inspectorate unit can be provisionally set up and start operating when ready. This would ensure that a basic treaty organization is in