

Commission could achieve a more distinctive and valuable contribution to the UN's work in this field by adopting a modus operandi that is distinctive from those of political organs such as the Commission and the General Assembly. Specifically, rather than focussing on the adoption of resolutions as the ultimate output of the Sub-Commission, an effort might be made to produce a report that provides an analytical summary of the deliberations of members on the subjects it has debated. Such an approach would appear far more appropriate to the expert "think tank" role that the Sub-Commission is expected to play. In this connection, we would encourage more thorough consideration of the suggestions made last year by some experts that the Sub-Commission's debate on human rights violations might be handled in such a fashion. However, this is a method that might usefully be applied to the Sub-Commission's work across the spectrum of its agenda.

Finally, to sustain a valuable and unique role for the Sub-Commission, it is above all essential to uphold the principle of the independence of its experts. There are, I realize, differing perceptions of this principle, but my Government's approach to it is necessarily uncompromising: we would not consider it appropriate to nominate for Sub-Commission membership anyone whose functions involve direct governmental service in the development or execution of Canada's policy in the United Nations Human Rights field. The extent to which such mixing of functions is in fact observed, and often gives rise to blatantly political behaviour (for example in attacks by members of NGOs that have criticized their governments), is the cause of a great deal of scepticism about the real, distinctive value of the Sub-commission's work.