

That law perserves the earth a sphere,
And guides the planets in the course."

In order to detect the Universal Law of which the varying Phenomena are only so many illustrations. Science calls into activity the highest powers of the mind. The power of fixing upon the points of agreement with the implied discrimination, constitutes the essential nature of thought itself, and not even in Mathematics is there required a more concentrated attention to the agreements and differences of objects, nor is this power ever exercised upon more intricate details. When it is apparent that Science employs the highest powers of judging and comparing, why will anyone say that Science has not an important Educational effect. There is room for as logical and continuous thinking as in Mathematics, while the scientific conception of the world is much higher. Mathematics takes you no farther than the conception of an aggregate, Physics first introduces the student to the study of relations more intricate than those of space, which study is carried to a higher form in Chemistry, but in Botany the student observes certain Chemical and Physical processes going on in the roots and body of the plant, but an analyses of those processes is not a sufficient explanation of the Phenomenon of life. Those processes apparently are all relative to the one end, the life of the plant. For the full explanation the student requires to bring to his observations the idea of an end or purpose, to which end or purpose all the Chemical changes and all the movements of the material in the body of the plant are subordinated. The same thing holds of any Science of organized matter, and it is at least suggested to the student that all nature is relative to one supreme end or purpose. But we have not exhausted the good effects of Scientific study when we have said that the tendency of Science is to arrive at the conception of nature. As a rational system the habits of study, application and regard for truth, which are formed in the Scientific quest for uniformity, are as invaluable in other departments, but especially in the various duties of life. Virtue may not be habit. Virtue, I suppose, is a sort of combination of knowing thought and doing it, but the formation of good habits is one of the safeguards of virtue and good habits of application, perseverance, patience, and regard for truth, are certainly formed in the study of Science. If I may be allowed a rather questionable mode of expression, truth appears to be truer when it is a truth of nature. It is there eternal and immutable and it will profit us nothing to try to reason it always. It cannot be made a matter of words as it too often appears to be in other departments. The Scientific inquirer must not be discouraged if he cannot at once reconcile his theory with facts. He must try and try again. It is the truth he is in search of and he knows it will in the end be discovered if he were to explain anything by the easier method of an hypothesis. If he does make use of an hypothesis it is always with the clear understanding that it is only a temporary expedient which in the end must be replaced by a

truer account. In brief the Scientific man's whole habit of life is a reverence for what is true, and a patient effort to discover it. The necessity of taking into account everything that can in any way alter our result and the habit of testing our conclusion by repeated experiments, will have a decided effect in preventing over hasty generalizations. How often do we hear judgments passed on men and things, upon very insufficient data, a people judged by our experience of a single individual—judgment which the Scientific spirit would have told us were not warranted by the facts.

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No. II.

WE managed to get along well enough in our last article without putting the title of this section of the JOURNAL to any severe strain. One can always talk about philosophy and philosophers without giving much trouble to those whom earlier thinkers, with a slight suggestion of contempt, apt to be resented by those concerned, called "the vulgar." But, perhaps, when one leaves such superficial talk and comes down to "hard pan," the matter is not so simple. "Eh, man!" said Carlyle to a popular novelist, "your books are very amusing, just amusing, but when you come to write a real book, ah!" "Your philosophy" objectors may say, "gets on well enough in 'undress' when it is not philosophy, but when you come to give us real philosophy, ah!" We fear that there may be something in this, and that we shall be "hoist with our own petard." Be it so; we shall only share the fate of better men, and as we find ourselves soaring skywards, we shall try to bear the elevation with the equanimity becoming in a philosopher even "in undress."

We casually mentioned in our opening remarks that our young friend, Mr. Dewey, had written two articles which showed great ability, although, perhaps, their main contention was doubtful. Mr. Dewey, despite his enthusiasm and his capacity for hitting from the shoulder, is evidently a kindly soul. He would like to persuade the English empiricist not to knock him on the head. And so he will go about with him, and lead him by a way he knows not of until he suddenly rubs his eyes and finds himself very far from home indeed. For it is Mr. Dewey's aim in *Mind* No 41, to show that Locke and the whole of his English followers really are Absolute Idealists, if only they knew it! They appeal to "experience," don't they? Well, then, "experience" is knowledge. Knowledge is of the true or "universal;" there is no knowledge without a knowing subject, therefore, "experience" is never merely individual experience, but experience of the universal. Q. E. D. This is very pretty, but is it convincing? When the English psychologist recovers a little from his astonishment at finding himself in so queer a position, and actually arm-in-arm with his hated foe, the Transcendentalist, he will, we suspect, utter protestations and emit ejaculations of a somewhat vigorous character. "I object," he