

confession of failure. After a good deal of assumption, and arbitrary dealing with facts we have a principle reached which, when reached, is confessed to be of little service unless you bring to its aid other principles, such as conscience, we presume. We have presented to us a principle which is to be the supreme guide of human conduct, yet throughout a large part of human conduct must be practically laid aside and other principles substituted. An ethical theory like this stands self-condemned.

The ethical nature of man refuses to fit itself into an evolution of non-ethical elements. However much we may allow to the evolution of molecules, something *new* emerges on the scene when consciousness appears, and, however much we may allow to be accomplished by evolution when given the elements of pleasure and pain, something *new* emerges when free will and conscience appear. It is very clever to say that, "experiences of utility, organized and consolidated during all past generations of the human race, have been producing nervous modifications, which by continued transmission and accumulation have become in us certain faculties of moral intuition, certain emotions responding to right and wrong conduct which have no apparent basis in the individual experience of utility"; but all this does not account for "*oughtness*," for the fact that the sense of right is felt to be essentially different from the desire of pleasure, and from the perception of adjustment of means to ends. In the mere feelings of pleasure and pain, in nervous modifications, there is not the least kind of right and wrong and evolution fails to show how these ideas can be accounted for. Hence, we find a desire on the part of some writers of the evolutionary school to strike the word *ought* from their vocabulary; whilst others speak of conscience and obligation in such a way that they cease to represent the feelings and conceptions of the consciousness of the human race. Obligation is simply the necessity of using means to attain ends. Most pertinent is the question of Dr. Martineau in regard to this mode of procedure:—"You say that when you undress the *moral intuition*, and lay aside fold after fold of its disguise, you find nothing at last but naked pleasure and utility: then how is it that no foresight with largest command of psychologic clothes would enable you to invert the experiment and dress up these nudities in the august form of duty?"