

ships and one sloop of 16 guns. As it was the fashion of the British officer of the period, ashore or afloat, to indulge in a lot of petty expeditions, not necessarily connected, and having no bearing on the general issues of the contest, D'ESTAIN caught Lord Howe at anchor at Sandy Hook, on 11th July, 1778, with a squadron of four sixty four gun ships, ten fifty, two forty four, one 32 and one 20 gun ship. Inferior in weight of metal as well as numerically, it would be supposed a dashing officer would have seized the opportunity to strike a decisive blow, but Howe's dispositions were made in so masterly a manner, and with such a judicious display of tactical skill, that the French officer contented himself with a partial blockade.

A good deal of confused and unintelligible manœuvring now took place. The French admiral attempted to drive the British garrison from Newport, Rhode Island, brought his squadron into a similar position in the middle passage, to the Bay of Rhode Island, to that the British occupied at Sandy Hook, with this difference, that there was no room to manœuvre, and a vessel running in could lay another alongside, yard arm and yard arm, and thus decide the contest. Howe, instead of keeping his antagonist in the *cul de sac* he had entered, cruised so far to the south west, that a North East gale enabled D'ESTAIN to slip his cables, and stand out, form line of battle, and offer to engage, but his adversary declined, because he wanted the weather gauge, and finally a severe gale compelled both parties to take shelter. The French at Boston, the British at New York.

Admiral Buxton, who had relieved Lord Howe in command of the fleet, put to sea at the end of October for the purpose of attacking the French fleet, lying at Boston, but was blown off the coast and his squadron damaged by a gale on 1st November, and on the 3rd the Count D'ESTAIN sailed for the West Indies. The vices of the system under which General CLINTON acted, began at once to develop themselves, instead of striking at the vital and vulnerable points of the enemies defence, he resorted to the mischievous device of a host of petty expeditions, not much above the character of mere plundering raids, tending in no degree to harass the enemy, but reducing his own strength and shaking the discipline of his troops.

After D'ESTAIN had made the gross strategic mistake of sailing away to the West Indies, CLINTON, instead of pressing the army under WASHINGTON, securing the line of the Hudson, and thus ruining the United States defence in spite of the French alliance, despatches one detachment of troops to the West Indies, consisting of 5,000 men, conveyed by six ships of the line, weakening both army and navy, and another of 3,500 troops, with a corresponding convoy to Georgia, stumbling at last on the true strategic line, on the preservation of which, the existence of the United States depended.

The contest, now nearly at the end of its third year, had been principally supported by the Eastern or New England Provinces. The drain of men, money and material, was beginning to be sensibly felt, and it was evident that they could not support the wear and tear of another campaign. Under these circumstances, that appointed body of Dictators, the Congress, did not scruple to exercise coercion, and as the Carolinas and Georgia held a large majority of inhabitants hostile or indifferent to their rule, it was resolved to force them into the Army and compel contributions towards the general outlay. For this purpose, a tolerably well appointed force under General LINCOLN was kept on foot, and those parties amongst the planters that sided with Congress, were en-

couraged to force by plunder or threats their neighbors to declare themselves. For more than a year this course had produced a state of almost civil war in these provinces, and as their whole coast line for five degrees of latitude from Cape Henry to the mouth of the Savannah River, was peculiarly adapted to be the haunts of privateers, from the extent of the frequent and deep inlets, bays and estuaries, with which the coast is pierced, and which give it in reality all the advantages of a double coast line; it was an object of some importance to occupy all the main positions on it, and as it were, operate in the rear of the army of the United States. manœuvring between the Chesapeake and the Hudson.

Sir Henry CLINTON's intention appears to have been nothing more than to create a diversion by assisting the loyalists in Georgia, and the Carolinas. The full value of the strategy involved does not appear to have dawned on his mind, and at a later period he tried hard to disown that he contemplated doing anything like what he calls "solid operations" in this or any other expedition. Yet it is perfectly evident it was the most vulnerable point, most open to attack, and *solid operations* thereon would have been fatal to the United States without a shadow of doubt.

The sequence of events proved too strong for the British Generals intentions. Savannah was easily captured, and Augusta, 150 miles up the river occupied. During the summer a bold dash was made at Charleston by the British General PRESTON, which only failed because he did not possess sufficient pertinacity.

A series of raids followed which considerably hampered the operations of the troops under WASHINGTON, and if they had been systematical and succeeded by similar efforts on the Hudson, there can be no doubt, but the rebel colonies even with the disaster at Saratoga, and the French alliance, would be obliged to accept such a peace as the Parliament of Great Britain would see fit to dictate.

A junction of the French contingent and United States troops was effected within three or four marches of New York, Sir HENRY CLINTON having evacuated Rhode Island, as well as Stony Point, and Verplanck's on the Hudson, thus leaving the partially interrupted communications with the Eastern States obligingly open, when every reason, military as well as political, pointed out the necessity of holding these positions, and acting from them offensively. He allowed himself with a superior force to be blockaded in New York by troops numerically, as well as morally, inferior, wanting all the proper material of war, with a fleet superior to anything which could be brought against it. Indeed his whole strategic capacity judged by the events amounted to planning small raids. In accordance with this policy, he devised an expedition against Charleston at the close of 1779, and after a tedious navigation of forty seven days, in which fearful loss by storm, capture and other accidents, was inflicted on the force, it was landed on John's Island, thirty miles from Charleston, with the loss of all the heavy artillery, and the horses of that arm and the cavalry. After a series of operations extending over ninety days, the town was surrendered, being no longer tenable. The fortress that involved all this fearful wear and tear was hardly entitled to be called third class. It mounted altogether, eighty four guns, and on the seafront was so defenceless, that it must have surrendered to the first frigate whose commander had pluck enough to anchor her before it. Its defence reflects

credit on General LINCOLN; its capture carried no laurels to CLINTON.

The fall of Charleston occurred in May 1780, and as information arrived that a reinforcement of French troops had landed on Rhode Island, Sir HENRY CLINTON was obliged to return to New York, leaving the Earl of CORNWALLIS in command with 4,000 troops and instructions to reduce North Carolina at once; the very foolish measure of organizing the lately reconciled rebels as a militia was resorted to and unbounded trust placed in the faith and honor of men, whom the sequel proved understood neither.

Paltry raids in which some miserable backwoods village was plundered and destroyed, harassing marches and insufficient food filtered away the strength of the force left at Charlestown, but at the same time it must be confessed that Earl CORNWALLIS and his subordinates gradually acquired a knowledge of the strategical value of the operations in which they were engaged and would have redeemed the honor of the English Army if properly seconded by CLINTON.

Under such men as TARLETON, FERROUSE, and SIMCOE, raids were pushed to the very boundary of those hills through which the line dividing Tennessee from the Carolinas runs and from the Savannah river in the South to York river in Virginia in the North, over an area covered by five degrees of latitude and seven degrees of longitude.

In view of this activity it is evident that very little could be effected by the troops under WASHINGTON's command and quite as little by the French allies; all they could do was done effectually; watch the British General at New York take advantage of his errors of omission and commission; he was not long in affording fitting opportunity to such antagonists.

During this campaign the disgraceful business of ARNOLD and ANDRE was enacted, with a noble army and powerful fleet lying on the line of communications between the French and their United States allies, CLINTON preferred to jeopardize the life of a valuable officer and the reputation of his army by an act of treachery for what he could have won in fair fight, even his imbecility kept both his antagonists quiet, they dared not move while CORNWALLIS was devastating their resources.

That able commander advanced from Charlestown along the course of the Santee and Wateree Rivers to Camden, Charlotte town and Wynneborough thence to Salisbury, on the head waters of the Great Pedee to the Roanoke River, on the south side of the Cape Fear River to Wilmington and thence crossing the Skuse to Petersburg on the Rappahannock, thence to Richmond and after marching over all the Peninsula included between the York and James Rivers, finally brought his army to Yorktown awaiting the co-operation of CLINTON.

In all these interminable marches his troops were supported in a great measure by the country through which he passed, and he swept away all opposition leaving hardly a foe in his rear, at least not one that could in the slightest degree interfere with the success of his operations.

An advance of CLINTON's force from New York would have driven at this junction WASHINGTON's troops before it and his army would have dispersed before it could reach the Delaware, the handful of French at Rhode Island would be incapable of resistance and if CLINTON had advanced during August, 1781, the war of the Revolution would have come to a different conclusion, on the 21st of that month Earl Cornwallis' army occupied Yorktown.