

of Picket Hill, and while our 40-pounders engaged the guns on Baba Wali Kotal to keep the enemy in the pass and on the hills in front; the cavalry of the Candahar force to watch the Moorcha Pass and support the infantry, and six companies of infantry to occupy the village of Goondogaum and the adjoining hills, while General Gough with the cavalry of the Cabul force worked down past them to the Argandab River to cut off the enemy's retreat; the three brigades of the Cabul force to be massed in rear of Picket Hill and to deliver the real attack by clearing the gardens, storming the village of Ghundi Mulla Sahi Adad in front, then turn the corner of Pir Paimal Hill, and take the Baba Wali Kotal in rear and the enemy's position at Mazra in flank. The programme was carried out with great precision. The troops of the Candahar force, under General Burrows' command, took up their positions about 8.30, and the 40-pounders at the north end of Picket Hill, four companies of the Fusiliers, and the 19th Native Infantry behind the walls of the cavalry lines; the 4th Rifles and Ghoorkas in the village, two companies of the 1st Grenadiers, four companies of the 66th Regiment, and two companies of the 28th Native Infantry, under Brigadier-General Daubeny, continuing the line to the left along Picket Hill and Karez Hill to Ghilzina.

About 9 a.m. the 40-pounders opened on the Baba Wali Kotal, and were replied to by a very brisk fire from the enemy's guns posted there. The duel between them continued for the next two and a half hours. Shortly after the commencement of the artillery fire General Baker's Brigade, composed of the 72nd Highlanders, 5th Ghoorkas, and 2nd and 3rd Sikhs, started from the left of Karez Hill, whence Sir Frederick Roberts and his Staff watched the movements, and disappeared into the dense gardens on that side. C 2 Royal Artillery opened fire on the village of Ghundi Mulla Sahi Adad from the ground between Picket and Karez Hills and the screw-gun battery from the front of the latter. After a brief artillery fire some horsemen and infantry were seen escaping from the village. It appeared unoccupied, but when the 2nd Ghoorkas advanced in skirmishing order from the left a hot fire from the houses showed that the place was full of men. The 92nd Highlanders in the meantime had formed up behind a garden on the right, and their leading companies working round behind it, advanced at a run in splendid style without firing a shot, and got into the village just as the Ghoorkas reached it from the low ground on the left. The enemy, all Ghazis, were soon seen streaming out beyond it towards Pir Paimal, but were quickly followed by General Macpherson's men, and the united brigades (General Baker having worked round so as to touch Macpherson's left) pushed on towards the Pir Paimal shoulder. General Ross now sent forward and took command of the 3rd Brigade remaining in reserve under the immediate orders of General Roberts. General Ross found the enemy's regulars strongly posted in front of the village of Pir Paimal, and in two camps on the level beyond it. They belonged, it is believed, to the Candahar regiments, and held their own steadily for some little time. But the British troops were not to be denied, and the enemy were soon in full flight up the valley under a hot artillery fire from our guns. This was enough for the main body of the enemy's infantry, and those posted in the Baba Wali Kotal, as soon as they saw their flank turned, retreated to the camp at Mazra, preceded by Ayub Khan and most of his officers. After this there was no more fighting as far as the infantry were concerned, and when General Roberts arrived with the 3rd Brigade the battle was over.

The cavalry of the Cabul force, under General Gough, left camp at eight a. m., and waited at Ahasalb for the development of the attack on Pir Paimal. At about

11 o'clock they proceeded to Kokaran, and, crossing the Argandab, pursued the straggling parties of the enemy to Shupin and the country round, and returned to camp at night via the Baba Wali Pass. About 300 of the enemy were cut up; two officers and twelve men were wounded. The cavalry, under General Nuttall, moved into position at eight o'clock to watch the Moorcha Pass and the hills in front of Baba Wali. At 2.30 the 3rd Cavalry and the 3rd Sind Horse pushed through the Baba Wali Pass, which was deserted, and pursued the enemy fifteen miles up the Argandab on its left bank to a point about four miles beyond Koja Mulla, cutting up over 100 between the villages and the hills. Had it not been for the numerous dense gardens and orchards in which the flying enemy took refuge, and where the cavalry could not get at them, the punishment of the enemy would have been much greater. Their loss was about 500 killed and the same number wounded, not including those cut up by the cavalry.

Thirty-one of Ayub's guns fell into our hands, the whole of his camp equipage, and a large quantity of ammunition and some grain and forage; also a few mules and an elephant. The 1st Brigade under General Macpherson, remained at Nazra, to guard the captured camp, and a strong picket was posted at the Baba Wali Pass.

The Indian Army.

The letters from India printed from time to time in our columns, as well as the official despatches which have been made public regarding the late operations in Afghanistan, will have prepared our readers for a consideration of those important questions concerning the improvement of the Indian Army, which must before long engage public attention. It will be necessary to decide whether the present system of employing and distributing a portion of the British Army in India is the best that can be devised, but it is undoubtedly of still more vital moment to the welfare of our Oriental Empire that the success of wise economy and dexterous management should mark whatever scheme we adopt for maintaining an army of native Indians. What good and daring service was done by the armies of Madras and Bombay in the troubled days of our early occupation of Hindostan is a matter of history. In later years the army of Madras has seldom seen fighting, and, with the exception of the interval of the Burmese wars in which it was engaged, has led since 1824 a life of almost unbroken ease. Bombay troops have fought more recently, and by their part in the first Afghan war, in the subjugation of Scinde, and in the Mooltan campaign were saved from so early a submission to habits of peace. The advance of our territory and the growing complication of our interests with external affairs towards the north and the west have placed upon the Bengal army the main burden of our later military operations, and it is accordingly the men of that army who to a natural superiority of warlike temperament have added more than any other section of the Indian people, the soldierly virtues created by the trial of active service. When the East India Company first formed its soldiers into battalions, each battalion, numbering one thousand men, had no more than a single European officer, who exercised the command. It was while thus composed that the armies of Madras, Bombay, and Bengal earned the title of brave and active soldiers. The Special Commission appointed in 1879 by the Governor-General of India to inquire into the organization and expenditure of the army in India, says, in its report, with regard to the early merit of these troops:—"During the long wars of the Carnatic and in the fierce campaigns against Mysore, native troops of the Madras and other armies displayed endurance, loyalty and courage, though they were often many months in arrears of pay, though they encountered many privations, and though the history of the native army during these forty years was che . . .