

which for the magnitude of its object and extent of preparations far outstripped any warlike expedition of modern times. Still amidst the difficulties of *managing* so immense an army, with all the cares and duties of the first magistrate of a great Empire upon his hands; and notwithstanding he found his path crossed and his wishes defeated by innumerable untoward chances we find his genius adequate to the herculean task, and steadily pushing forward to attain his favourite object. In giving a *correct view of such a man*, even superior accuracy of detail will wear the semblance of partiality, but the blame is not attributable to Mr. Segur if truth wears the aspect of panegyric. We might here conclude our remarks on this publication; and with confidence recommend it as a work deserving the notice of every reader of taste; but we consider an extract as the *best means of conveying a judgment of the style and manner in which it is written* and shall give one, in the hope that it may act as an additional inducement with what we have already said to a perusal of the whole work.

There is a very neat and correct map of the countries lying between Paris and Moscow, accompanies this work, and the volume commences with a dedication in the writer's usual happy style "To the Veterans of the Grand Army" who survived that expedition.

It will be *fresh in the recollection of all our readers* that the great object and chief aim of Napoleon's expedition to Russia in 1812, was to compel the Emperor Alexander to join in a league, which the former wished all Europe to combine in, so as to humble the power of Great Britain. Hitherto the conquests of the French Emperor had been acquired by his opponents placing the fate of a kingdom upon the decision of one battle; and which Bonaparte, by the overwhelming numerical force he had at his disposal, united with his talents as a General, *contrived to gain*. In the Russian expedition matters were managed differently, as the French army advanced; that of Russia fell back, stripping the country in their retreat of every thing calculated to support an army, and thereby leaving to their enemies only deserted villages and desolate houses; not a few of which were burnt to prevent their becoming a shelter to the invaders. In this way the Russians baffled every effort of the French Generals to bring them to an engagement until they reached near to Moscow. It is doubtful if Bonaparte after he had advanced to a certain extent, would have rested satisfied without going to Moscow even if Alexander had acceded to his wishes and given him a peace upon his own terms. Moscow seemed to be his destination from the moment he set out on the expedition. It would doubtless have been flattering to his inordinate ambition, to have dictated the conditions of a treaty to Alexander in his own capital. This feeling perhaps first led him on; and ultimately he had no recourse left but to get to Moscow to find winter quarters for his weary and exhausted army. What then must have been his feelings when he found himself defeated and disappointed in his only hope? What must he have suffered when he saw the intrepid Russians make that dreadful sacrifice to patriotism—lay their splendid capital in ashes sooner than it should be held in possession by an invading enemy. But we shall give the account of this event in General Segur's own words.

"It was an hour since Murat, and the long and close columns of