

is done in a third country like the United States. Measures may not be directed against us; they are directed against somebody else, but we are caught in the net. We are blindsided by these things, and I think we need to take that into account when looking at the pace of developments in Europe and wondering what they are going to do. I am not sure that they will aim any measures particularly against us, but it seems quite possible that they will aim some measures against other people. We must be careful to ensure that our interests are fully considered when their policy is being developed.

Now, I know that Canada's relation with the European Community is not something that I have just discovered. It is an object of closest consideration by the Canadian government and by other authorities in this country. There is a certain amount of liaison in place. I am glad that it is so. There have been information conferences across the country to tell Canadian business what 1992 is likely to look like, but I think we need something more than that.

Europe 1992 is not merely a scheme for the establishment of an integrated market. It is a crusade—which is another strong word, but, certainly, I got that impression—to transform Europe into a single economic and political entity. There are profound implications for the role of western Europe on the world stage, and, though for the time being Europe's defence will continue to be in the hands of NATO, NATO will certainly be affected, and Canada will be affected. The trading partners will be affected, and we are one of them. We must ensure that our interests are taken into account and we must ensure that their people are informed and that our position is heard.

I am suggesting that one of the conclusions I drew from this meeting and from the impressions I received from my colleagues, who are there at the present time, was that Canada could do well to consider a more structured political and economic dialogue with the European Community on Europe 1992. We need to institutionalize, I suggest, regular and frequent meetings with the authorities of the European Community in Brussels. I even go so far as to suggest that they be on the prime ministerial level, and certainly on the ministerial and official level. I think that is a consideration that should be taken in hand right away. I put it to you that regular, high-level meetings are the best way of keeping Canada's agenda on the Europe 1992 table.

As the European Community structure unfolds, we must not be easy to overlook. I think that might well describe our situation at the present time. The sub-committee meeting on which I report shows that Europeans, even NATO Europeans, are fully engrossed in European affairs, and the interests of other interested parties like Canada will only be heard if we appear in person to be present and to present them. Our future economic interests and our political interests make it quite clear that we should do so.

If, as seems quite likely, Europe 1992 has the effect of marginalizing NATO, although perhaps that is too strong a word, the importance of being at the European Community table receives added emphasis if we want to be heard. In any

case, we do not want to be isolated in North America. We want to make our best efforts to make sure that our international connections are as broad as they possibly can be.

So I come back to my theme that the rise of the European Community as an economic superpower presents unknown problems to NATO, and it certainly presents unknown problems to us. The unexpected and unpredictable convulsions in eastern Europe, especially the inevitable unification of the two Germanys, compound the whole problem, as we can see our political leaders frantically running after events and trying to catch up.

We cannot tell what will be, but we know it will not be what has been. Until we know more about the shape of things to come, NATO is, in my opinion, a rock of stability, which will guard against anarchy in eastern Europe. It indeed could be a facilitator of German unification. Stability, I suggest, is a condition of peaceful change, and collective security is still in Canada's best interests. NATO has given us collective security. Indeed, it has been a major contributor to the anticipated outbreak of peace.

So I am saying that, in spite of these developments of which I speak, I still think that NATO has a place in the world and that we have a place in NATO. I am encouraged in these views by some remarkable statements that were given to us by our guest, Mr. Shevardnadze, when he spoke to the Foreign Affairs Committee of this chamber and the other chamber in room 200 in the West Block today. One of his remarks that I wrote down, because I feel it applies to this argument I am making, and here I think I am quoting him, was, "The United States and Canada will have a continuing role in the stability of Europe." That is the case for NATO. He also said, "Weigh change carefully. Proceed with deliberation and caution, step by step, moving only where the consequences are clear. The two blocs have a stabilizing role, and they have a stabilizing role in the problem of the unification of Germany now before us." That is the message that I got from Mr. Shevardnadze today, and it indicates the basic reasons why I think it is in the interests of this nation that we retain our position in NATO and be careful about the changes that will be coming. However, make no mistake about it: change is coming. The question is to manage it carefully.

As the risks of war recede, the military role of NATO, I think, will be relegated to the background and its political aspects will emerge as being of more importance. The relations between NATO and the European Community will also be critical factors. Canada cannot at the present time predict how they will associate themselves with one another, but the possibilities of their doing so, or the necessity of their doing so, will become even more obvious as time goes by.

It is unlikely, of course, that the need for defence will fade away, but let us use the experience of our collective security arrangements through NATO to move that alliance in new, productive, political peace-keeping uses. I hope that when the day comes when these arrangements have to be shaped and structured—which probably will not be tomorrow but certainly