

have done before the late elections. He says, indeed, that the British Government did not want to be handicapped at those elections by any promise. But, Sir, if this scheme for relieving unemployed Britons by sending them out to our North-West was to be an advantage for the British people, why should it be unpopular? Why not proclaim it on every hustings? Why not make it a battle cry in the elections? But, the hon. gentleman says that would not do; the people were not to know. It was like a certain arrangement which was agreed to in this part of the world, with reference to this same Pacific Railway, which "should be kept quiet until after the elections." It is now, however, alleged that there was a bargain. Well, it seems to me that the hon. gentleman's plans in England, under these circumstances, failed. It was because the hon. gentleman found that it would be useless for him to communicate officially that he has nothing to give us. It was because his informal and confidential communications resulted unfavourably, that as Sir Michael Hicks-Beach says, there was nothing put on paper, and the hon. gentlemen came back here with no more assurances than they had before they left Canada. This we know because the hon. gentleman has made a statement to us on the subject, he has told us what his expectations are. He has told us the resolutions he is going to bring down. There is to be a resolution modifying the plan for the sale of the lands. Instead of selling them at \$2 an acre all round, they have adopted another plan, and want to modify this resolution accordingly. But we hear nothing about further resolutions touching Imperial aid. Still, the hon. gentleman says he had many conferences with politicians and capitalists, and the Finance Minister made complete arrangements for all the funds that may be required for the completion of the Pacific Railway from sea to sea, so that, as fast as he wants it, he can get the money, provided we give him authority to raise the taxes required to pay principal and interest. He says also that the prospect of an Imperial guarantee from Mr. Forster, if he is to be the new Colonial Secretary, are quite as good

as were the prospects of a guarantee by the Beaconsfield Government. That may be so, and I dare say it is so; but the reason given by the hon. gentleman was a speech which Mr. Forster had delivered at the Colonial Institute. My hon. friend's memory is of that character of which memories often are. He remembered what was agreeable, and forgot what was painful. He remembered well Mr. Forster's diplomatic suggestion, that "he was not sure that it might not be advisable for the Government to be very liberal in these matters," and he turns that into a promise. But as to the *quid pro quo*, Free-trade with Britain, which Mr. Forster suggests the hon. gentleman utterly forgot all about that. Mr. Forster says that the liberality must not be all on one side; that it is not fair to ask the Mother Country for assistance, and then to throw obstacles, by means of Protection, in the way of their disposing of their manufactures in the Colonies. Well, I will say, frankly, that if the arrangement for aid from the Imperial Government should turn out to be one for a guarantee only, I am not at all certain it would be a blessing to this country that the guarantee should be obtained. It is true the guarantee would enable us to raise money at a lower rate than that at which we are raising it. It is true, also, that it might enable us to raise money which we could not raise at all without the guarantee. But it will not help us to pay the money we borrow; and I do not think it always a convenient thing to have facilities for borrowing money, unless we see also that there are commensurate facilities for repaying it. The explorations which the Government took authority to make, resulted in a report by the Chief Engineer, in which he suggested that they were so far favourable to the northerly route as to render it improper to commence at that time construction in British Columbia, and expedient to make further explorations. The Government, however, decided adversely to that view, and determined to finally adopt the route to Burrard Inlet. Now, even with all the haste that was used in reaching this decision, it had become impossible at that time to fulfil the arrangements, on the basis of which Parliament had been asked