

All our efforts, however, to remove misunderstandings were summarily rejected in the telegram from Peking of December 21 to the President of the General Assembly.

Notwithstanding this uncompromising and negative attitude of the Peking Government, the Political Committee asked the cease-fire group on January 4 not to abandon its task, but to try again to meet any legitimate doubts and anxieties on the part of Peking by drawing up a statement of principles and a programme which might guide any discussion and underlie any settlement of Far Eastern issues once a cease-fire had been brought about in Korea. Our group, as the representatives know, submitted such a statement on last January 11. It was fully discussed by this Committee, after which fifty Member States formally approved it and requested its transmission to the Peking Government for their observations.

There were many members of this Committee at that time who felt that, in making this further effort to bring about a negotiation of Far Eastern difficulties with those who were intervening in great force in Korea to assist the aggressor, we were weakening and indeed humiliating the United Nations, and that we should proceed at once to a condemnation of Communist China as an aggressor.

There was a second group which felt that almost everything should be subordinated to the necessity of stopping the fighting and getting those most concerned, including the People's Government in Peking, around the council table with a view to a peaceful and honourable settlement of Korean and other Far Eastern questions. This viewpoint was, I think, based in part at least on a feeling that United Nations action in Korea on and after the crossing of the 38th parallel gave some reason for the Chinese in Peking -- cut off as they are from normal contacts with so much of the outside world -- to fear for the security of their position in Manchuria and of their regime generally.

There was a third group which agreed that, whatever might be the rights or wrongs of the matter, we should further prove our good will and our unswerving desire and, indeed, determination to bring about a peaceful solution by making one further effort at peaceful settlement before proceeding to any condemnatory resolution; that without such further effort it would be difficult to preserve the unity of the free world in the United Nations in regard to action in Korea. Some of the members of the Committee, while taking this view, were frankly pessimistic about the result.

Finally, there was the Soviet bloc to whom the question was a simple one. The United Nations had merely to deny and disavow the action it had taken, yield to every single demand of those it had termed aggressors, and then there would be "peace". As for Far Eastern problems generally, the Soviet bloc position was, just give the forces of international Communism directed and controlled by Moscow their own way, and soon there would be no problems. Of course, they do not put it this way -- they talk about peoples' democracies and American