

A sober approach to missile defence is to view it as one of many responses to the new variety of perceived threats to international peace --- and one that may contribute to a revitalized and renovated non-proliferation principles. First, when deterrence fails, missile defences can offer protection to population centers against the use of missiles armed with WMD. In this case missile defences provide a safety net against deterrence failure, especially when an opponent is armed with only a small number of missiles, the case with most rogue states. They also offer a chance to deter in a less traditional way. Even the limited defense of Israel by U.S. Patriot missiles during the Gulf War prevented Tel Aviv from taking retaliatory action against Iraq --- with possibly catastrophic consequences. Second, the ability to defend forward-deployed forces operating with a NATO or UN mandate against the missiles of a regional belligerent may well become critical to the political will of the international community to project power for humanitarian, peacekeeping, or peacemaking missions. Indeed, a TMD capacity could in time become critical to the very legitimacy among Western publics of multilateral military actions which during the 1990s were considered morally defensible but politically risky. Third, international cooperation on TMD may actually provide a vehicle for improving relations between potential adversaries. Precisely this was once proposed by President Yeltsin and other Russian officials concerned to promote U.S.-Russian cooperation in the area of missile defence. Considered together, these arguments in favor of effective missile defences can contribute to traditional non-proliferation measures, "specifically, by decreasing the military and political utility that many states attribute to missiles," thereby reducing the incentive to acquire them."<sup>30</sup> This principle, deterrence-by-denial, essentially denies an adversary the ability to achieve his goals by military means --- or at least blunts the effectiveness of those means.

In the current international environment a choice *between* deterrent and defensive principles is unrealistic and not at all helpful to the beleaguered cause of non-proliferation. In a recent article on the cruise missile threat to the United States Michael O'Hanlon concluded that:

If we rule out, as we should, both technological impossibility and technological inevitability arguments, and if we recognize that resources for defense are far more elastic in national crisis than almost anyone thinks they are in normal times, then the question of cruise missile defense falls into the familiar and proper context of political judgments about competing needs.<sup>31</sup>

Missile defences have something to offer against a tangible and growing peril. Governments need to focus on the question of the fiscal resources and the political capital they are willing to commit in return for the kind of security that missile defences offer now and may offer in the future. They need, in other words, to engage missile defence as political choice, rather than a philosophical argument.

### **III Missile Defence and Global Surveillance**

Under the general label of missile defence, a variety of systems for the detection and interception of missiles at a theatre, regional, and strategic level are currently in research and development. A comprehensive national missile defence "architecture" on the order advocated by the Bush administration is far and away the most ambitious, aiming in principle at an "astrodome" shield for the United States against any and all contingencies of ballistic missile attack. Such a system consists of three elements: boost-phase, mid-course, and terminal phase technologies. Critics of the administration's program, though not of missile defence in principle, point out that the current state of the technological progress across the three elements is uneven<sup>32</sup> The U.S. NMD system in development features radar or satellites (detection and early warning); ground-based radars to track warheads and decoys (tracking); and multi-stage, rocket-powered interceptor missiles