good works of nuclear disarmament that should be their own reward, and with the proceeds to build reliance on RGPu.[8]

The Agreement, in contrast, points in the right direction, which is to burn excess Russian and U.S. WGPu down rather than see Russia prepare to breed civil plutonium as it is helped to burn military plutonium. The Agreement rightly aims to defer and restrict Minatom's capacity to accumulate and rely upon civil plutonium derived in part from international support for the disposition of Russian military plutonium.

With this as our judgment, let us gather the main policy inferences which have surfaced thus far. Insofar as the parties have an interest in ensuring the long-term sustainability of disposition against foreseeable physical and political threats to its integrity, sense of worth, and credibility right out to the last tonne, they might in preparing a Multilateral Agreement:

- acknowledge that irreversibility trumps nuclear safety and environmental protection in securing the process of disposition over the long haul;
- affirm and strengthen the bias of the Agreement against closed fuel-cycle development, avoiding the export-all option in particular;
- as per U.S. alternative (5), give priority support to conversion under IAEA verification; make a financial commitment, possibly to cover IAEA verification costs in particular;
- avoid linking disposition excessively to related international security issues, for example to prompt action against nuclear hedging;
- strive to obtain R.F. and U.S. acceptance, even in principle only, of talks for verified disposition of strategic nuclear warheads held in or planned for the hedge, beginning with dismantlement and conversion as per U.S. alternative (5);
- see what can be done to get the R.F. and U.S. to resume bilateral talks to limit the reprocessing of spent fuel, aiming initially at a 40-year moratorium in both countries;
- relatedly and in a variation on U.S. alternative (3) concerning new reactors, explore the potential for long-term cooperation in the development of a new megaburner in Russia to dispose of all plutonium and spent fuel;
- provide for the cessation of civil plutonium separation at Mayak; do the same for continued separation of some 1.5 tonnes of WGPu annually at Seversk and Zheleznogorsk;
- as per U.S. alternative (3), consider adding to the Agreement purpose-built new international LWRs if the R.F. and U.S. agree to a moratorium on spent-fuel reprocessing;

[8] Extortion is too strong a word. Nevertheless, the Russian nuclear-materials control and civil nuclear power situation is such that others are ready to pay the Russian Federation to make itself and thus everyone else safer. Russia therefore has an incentive not to take as full responsibility as it otherwise might for its own situation. To do so would lower the potential for future subsidy (Darst, 2001). All of this suggests a talent for converting weakness into strength. Horror-show stories about lax nuclear-materials security in Russia help to keep the money coming in. For a good example of the process at work, see Erlanger, 2001, which conveys Russian reports of serious lapses in materials control to readers of *The New York Times*.