

CONCLUSION

The period since the Vienna FUM has seen a sea change in participating states' interest in using the CSCE to address security problems and in the CSCE's ability to do so. Canada has been one of the most ardent champions of giving the CSCE teeth to deal with conflicts in the CSCE area and, since early 1990, has (fairly) consistently advanced and supported initiatives towards this end. The Canadian contribution has been at both the conceptual and the operational level.

Concept

At the level of concept, Canada has insisted throughout that the CSCE should retain its multidimensional focus and its comprehensive membership. This reflects Canada's understanding of the requirements of cooperative security. It led to Canadian efforts to strengthen human dimension commitments and to tie their implementation to the CSCE's developing conflict prevention machinery, something which happened through such devices as CSO consideration of human dimension questions, use of missions to address human dimension problems, and the initiation (by the Netherlands) of the post of High Commissioner on National Minorities. Canada put less effort into, and saw less success, in maintaining an active Basket II, in part because the plethora of European economic institutions -- the EC, EBRD and ECE, as well as the international OECD, IMF and GATT -- meant there was little left for the CSCE to do in this area. In addition, Canada never clearly explicated just how the economic dimension could be linked to conflict prevention mechanisms, other than to note that failures and strains of economic development can lead to intra-state tensions, which Canada was in practice attempting to tackle through the human dimension anyhow. Nonetheless, the CSCE maintains an agenda of activity in all three baskets, and all three are now firmly institutionalized.

Canada has also been a strong supporter of maintaining the CSCE's broad membership. It has sought continued reference in CSCE documents to the importance of the transatlantic dimension. It has also promoted the active participation of all ex-Yugoslav and ex-Soviet states, reasoning that it is better to have these states attempting to live up to CSCE commitments, and to provide an avenue for outside encouragement and pressure, than not. Canada was not keen on the 1992 decision to suspend rump Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) from the CSCE, which eventually led to the scotching of the long-term mission to Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina.

Similarly, Canada has been a leading advocate of improving the CSCE's political cooperation and institutional ties with other security organizations, such as the UN and NATO, and in encouraging outside observers (earlier Japan, now Korea) to sit in on CSCE meetings. Again this reflects Canada's multilateralist inclinations and its view of security as being achieved through overlapping, interlocking global and regional institutions.

Another conceptual contribution came through Canada's insistence that the CSCE's strength lay in conflict prevention and resolution, and that it should establish a broad stable of instruments towards this end. As early as May 1990, Canada set out a detailed vision of how the CSCE's crisis prevention and conflict resolution function might operate. It proposed institutions for political consultation and oversight, and operational mechanisms ranging from