

All arguments aside about the rights or wrongs of countries opposing or not fully supporting or contributing to UNAMIR prior to April 6th, the international perception of the situation by May 17th was fundamentally different. The deeds were done, the facts were known, and the Security Council had passed Res. 918 agreeing to expand UNAMIR to 5500 with an expanded mandate. It is revealing to view the slowness with which TCN's then provided troops or equipment on the ground in Rwanda.

On May 17th with the passing of Res. 918, there were 471 UNAMIR troops remaining on the ground in Rwanda. Two months later, there were only 550 troops on the ground, an increase of 89. On August 10th, almost three months after Res. 918, there were only 1,257 troops on the ground, leaving them 4,293 short.

In a hard hitting press conference, Under-Secretary General Kofi Annan set out what he saw as the reasons for these delays;¹⁸

- many countries offered troops without equipment;
- equipment offered not enough or not what is needed;
- some insisted on exorbitant reimbursement for equipment and their demands had to be negotiated down;
- some equipment offered requiring reconditioning and repairs;
- complications of matching equipment with troops (eg. logistics and training);
- apart from Canada absolutely no airlift capacity into Kigali offered;
- commercial airlift insurance prohibitive;
- UN secretariat administrative delays¹⁹.

He prefaced his comments by stating that "prompt and effective action to strengthen UNAMIR could have mitigated the terrible human toll of recent months." He then closed off by referring to the ongoing affront to the conscience of the world and that "There is nothing UNAMIR needs that the Member States of the United Nations do not already possess, and could provide if the necessary political will existed to do so." (emphasis added)

RECOMMENDATION

Canada and other concerned TCN's should collaborate on and publish a policy statement and set of guidelines addressing the need to provide fully trained peacekeeping troops and

¹⁸ See his background notes for the press conference of July 28 1994, and the subsequent and more diplomatic letter of the SG to the SC dated 1 August 1994 but carrying the same message, "What is required is the political will".

¹⁹ It should be noted that they did attempt to move quickly and in fact DPKO put out the request for troops 5 days before Res 918 in anticipation of its passing. Invariably however, the DPKO branch tasked with putting together peacekeeping missions just did not have sufficient staff to conduct the rather convoluted negotiations forced upon it by various contributors in order to nail down troop and equipment offers.