

- (4) zones should not disturb existing security arrangements;
- (5) zones should prohibit the development or possession of any nuclear explosive device;
- (6) zones should not infringe on the exercise of rights recognized under international law, particularly the freedom of navigation, innocent passage and overflight; and
- (7) zones should not affect the rights of parties to grant transit privileges, port calls or overflights.¹¹

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union laid down two criteria for supporting a NWFZ:

- (1) the readiness of other nuclear powers to accept and honour the denuclearized status of the area; and
- (2) the completeness of obligations of the contracting powers and the extent to which they insure the zone's denuclearized status.¹²

In 1988, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev expressed strong support for NWFZs. Current Russian arms control policy includes "supporting the creation of nuclear-free zones and granting appropriate guarantees to the states which participate."¹³ The British, French and Chinese positions have tended to examine each NWFZ on a case-by-case basis, with positions evolving or changing in the light of the different circumstances.

Proposed NWFZs: Problems and Prospects

Four proposed NWFZs continue to receive attention: South Asia, the Middle East, the Korean Peninsula, and Central and East Europe.

South Asia:

Pakistan proposed a NWFZ in South Asia in the aftermath of India's nuclear explosion in 1974. India, citing that the proposal was made without prior consultations and agreement among the countries in the area, immediately rejected the proposal. Since then, India has continued to oppose a South Asia zone on the ground that nuclear issues in South Asia cannot be separated from those in the wider Asia-Pacific region, especially due to the existence of a nuclear power, China, in the proximity, as well as the presence of foreign military bases with nuclear weapons in the Indian Ocean area (such as Diego Garcia). India also argues that regional approaches to non-proliferation cannot be effective since nuclear proliferation is a global problem requiring global solutions.¹⁴ The Indian position suggests that success in negotiating a NWFZ depends critically on several factors: an agreement on what constitutes the region, a strong sense of regionalism, and regional consensus concerning the utility of nuclear weapons. South Asia, lacking these attributes, has found it difficult to achieve meaningful progress toward a NWFZ.