

Enhancing "Mixed" Supply- and Demand-side Controls to Stem Conventional Proliferation

The goal of "mixed" measures to constrain conventional proliferation is to bridge the gap between supply-side and demand-side measures in order to overcome the inevitable resistance to exclusively supply-side measures that recipient states have argued are discriminatory and unfair. In a purely monopolistic or oligopolistic system, such objections would be moot, as the powerful suppliers could merely assert control and effectively restrict the flow of weapons and technology (at least in principle). In the global arms transfer and production system of today and the near future, however, such purely supply-side controls are impossible to exercise, because suppliers face economic imperatives to export arms, because there are always several channels of supply, and because the relative balance of power between suppliers and recipients has shifted in favour of the latter. All of these factors suggest that the correct approach to constraining proliferation is to design measures that rest on one of two kinds of "linkages":

- they involve some form of cooperative "bargain" between suppliers and recipients;
- they are linked to some form of coercive pressure or influence that supplier states can exercise based on their possession of a scarce or desirable resource.

As the possibilities discussed below illustrate, there are no easy ways to overcome the tension between discriminatory supplier-based measures and non-discriminatory supplier-recipient arrangements. One can discern, however, five possible areas of attention that could form the basis for constraining conventional proliferation, some of which are currently being explored by various states and multilateral institutions.

The first, the development of *conditional technology access* regimes, would constrain proliferation by encouraging potential suppliers of military technology to participate in "robust" export control systems and information sharing mechanisms (analogous to the Australia group or MTCR). Such regimes would require strong national verification and compliance monitoring mechanisms, and the ability of other member-states to query these policies or particular applications of them. Most of the possible areas for control of these technologies have been mentioned above, and they focus on advanced technologies in the computing, electronics, communication, aerospace, precision-machining and materials sectors. A *conditional technology access* regime would be analogous to a "members' club" with three simple rules: specified high-technology goods will be traded freely among the members of the club; these goods will not be used militarily against other members of the club; and these goods will not be traded outside of the club. The second of these rules suggests that such a regime would have to be embedded within broader cooperative security arrangements.