

uncertainty.

An examination of the events and processes leading up to TAD is a useful case-study because it highlights two hypotheses about the conduct of Canadian foreign policy. First, it shows that the choices of Canadian policy-makers are significantly constrained by Canada's relative lack of power in the face of the emerging and present architects of the international system, that is, the Community and the US. This makes Canada's foreign policy largely responsive. The chronology of TAD shows unequivocally that increased personal contacts between Community leaders and Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and Mulroney's close relationship with US President Bush, although necessary and important, were not sufficient to create the final agreement.¹⁰ Rather, the explanation lies in the proclivity of the EC and the US to intensify bilateral relations which in turn determined the policy options available to Canadian decision-makers. Thus the EC-US negotiations set parameters for the subsequent EC-Canada declaration.

What also emerges from this analysis is the rational actor approach of Canada in the management of its relations with the United States. Evidence is presented to support the thesis that Canada's relations with the United States in large measure determines the configuration of its other bilateral relations - in this case with the European Community. The TAD is very much an outgrowth of the Government's desire by 1990 to be perceived as reacting positively to the new geo-political realities of Europe and the Community's increasing role therein. Although not explicitly stated by the Government, some observers have asserted that the TAD, like the "Europe 1992" component of "Going Global" that preceded it, reflects the Government's desire to use improved bilateral relations with Brussels as a 'counterweight' to Canada's relations with the US.¹¹

The notion of creating a 'counterweight' of course gives rise to a discussion of Canada's ability, despite its modest national attributes, and through its emphasis on and pioneering efforts in establishing multilateral institutions, to manage the impact of the international system beyond what could be expected. In Canada's diplomatic history there have been occasions in which it has exhibited a leadership capacity, to wit: Was Canada, in the case of the TAD, merely following US policy responses to increasing European economic and political integration? That is a question. Or was Canada demonstrating a discernible leadership?

The second theme that is drawn out by this paper, given the statist orientation of Canadian foreign policy (where the federal cabinet ministers and bureaucrats are the most important actors), is the inherent bureaucratic/Ministerial tension in a parliamentary system