

(Mr. Ekeus, Sweden)

During the intersessional work this autumn and in January 1987 we will be able to address a broad range of issues vital for a Chemical Weapons Convention. My delegation would look with special interest on the questions of régimes for super-toxic lethal chemicals and of order of destruction.

Although we hope that we shall be able to register real progress during the intersessional work, many difficult problems remain. I can only mention declaration and verification of stocks of chemical weapons and the related issue of order of destruction of chemical weapons and their production facilities as well as régimes for different categories and items of chemical weapons production facilities and for activities not prohibited by the Convention.

One of the outstanding key issues is the question of challenge inspection. Useful work on this issue has been carried out within Working Group C of the Committee under the able guidance of Mr. Wisnoemoerti of Indonesia.

We note the statement, repeated in the Conference as late as earlier this week, by the United States, that the challenge inspection arrangements contained in the United States proposal, document CD/500, is not a take-it-or-leave-it proposal. We have in this context studied with great attention the recent proposal by the United Kingdom, document CD/715, which contains some important elements. Likewise, we consider the proposals by the German Democratic Republic and Poland, document CD/CW/WP.136, and by Pakistan, document CD/685, as being helpful to the work.

My delegation shares the view that if, in exceptional circumstances, there were serious and well-founded suspicions of significant breaches of the provisions of the Convention, a State Party should be obliged to accept some form of on-site inspection without undue delay. At the same time, it is of the greatest importance that provisions for such inspections take into consideration legitimate security interests of States Parties and that they should not, in this context, be used for purposes not directly connected to the Convention on Chemical Weapons.

During recent years we have developed a well-balanced and rather robust organizational framework for the work of the Ad Hoc Committee. This system has served us well. Also, the method applied by the Chairman of the Committee to concentrate the negotiations on the continuing development of a rolling text has worked well and ascertained that results achieved during earlier negotiations have not been lost. When the negotiations now are approaching more decisive stages, the subjects for negotiations appear to be more specific and more diverse than before. On the one hand, there are a number of problems of great political and technical significance and complexity; on the other hand, there is a mass of loose ends remaining after general agreements have been reached on some of the main issues. Further, there are several provisions necessary for the future convention which so far have not been touched upon and have been subject only to a limited consideration.

The organization of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee next session should, in the opinion of my delegation, be designed with these new characteristics of the subject matter in mind. It should thus be possible to develop the