

and with a look of astonishment and perplexity. "No, I do not dream, for I can feel, and see, and know what I was, and what I am. Grieve as thou mayest, no remedy is in thy breast."

"In a little time after, while Sigismund remained perplexed by the parting word of Basilius, his attention was attracted by the entrance of Rosaura, who now appeared dressed in her own habiliments. She was proceeding in search of Estrella, anxious at the same time to avoid the sight of Astolpho, Clotaldus having advised her to leave him in ignorance of her presence at the court of Poland. She felt grateful to Clotaldus for the interest which he appeared to take in her fortunes, and readily submitted to his guidance.

"What," said Clarin to Sigismund, "has pleased thee most of all that thou hast seen this morning?" "Nothing has surprised me," said Sigismund, "for I have seen nothing here that my education did not in some measure enable me to anticipate. But if my admiration has been really moved at all, it has been by the beauty of the ladies who have left us."

"At this moment perceiving Rosaura about to retire, he started forward and detaining her, exclaimed, "What do I see? I have surely beheld those features before now."

"And I," said Rosaura, "have seen that pomp and greatness reduced to chains, and a dungeon." Saying this, she attempted to retire, but Sigismund again prevented her. "I must crave your permission to depart," said Rosaura, in some confusion.

"Going in such a hurried manner," said Sigismund, "is not asking leave but taking it?" At this moment, Clotaldus, whose anxiety had been greatly excited by hearing Rosaura's voice in dispute with Sigismund, hurried into the apartment. "My lord," he exclaimed, "what is the cause of this? Pray you forbear and suffer the lady to proceed."

"Again," exclaimed Sigismund, "again, thou grey-headed madman, darrest thou to provoke my anger? dost thou not fear me yet?" "I was induced to enter," said Clotaldus, "by the accents of this voice, to tell thee that thou shouldst be more peaceful if thou desiredst to reign. Be not a tyrant because thou thinkest thyself our lord, for you may yet find that thought a dream."

The anger of Sigismund was provoked to the highest by this threat. "I shall see," he exclaimed, "whether it be a dream by tearing thee to pieces." He grasped his dagger hastily, but Clotaldus arrested his arm and threw himself on his knees, whilst the affrighted Rosaura called loudly for assistance.

Her cries were heard by Astolpho, who rushed into the room, and throwing himself between the prince and the object of his anger, "What means this? that so generous a prince will stain his dagger in blood that is well nigh frozen? Let thy shining sword return to its scabbard."

"Yes," said Sigismund, "after I have reddened it in that villain's heart." "Then," replied the pompous Astolpho, "since he has sought protection at my feet, he shall not plead in vain." And seeing the prince about to transfer his anger from Clotaldus to himself, he drew his sword and stood on the defensive.

The noise attracted to the place, the King, Estrella, and several of their attendants, who interposed between the combatants. Astolpho returned his sword to its sheath, and the king, being informed that Sigismund had attempted the life of Clotaldus, said to the former:

"Have grey hairs, then, no respect in thine eyes?" "None," replied Sigismund, "and I trust that one day I shall see thine own at my feet. Be assured that the opportunity for vengeance shall not be lost." "Before that day comes," replied the king, "thou shalt sleep, and waking find that thy boast, and thy ingratitude, real as they seem to thee, are but the phantoms of an idle dream."

Once more Sigismund started at the words, and remained for some moments as if under the influence of a spell, motionless and silent, while the king and his guests departed. Astolpho leading out Estrella, conducted her towards the garden, where the following conversation passed between them.

Moses was the first chosen chief. Judges followed in succession, appointed by Almighty God Himself. The people clamoured for a king; to be like other nations, as they said. They had grown tired of their holy law and their inspired leaders. God was displeased with their choice and with their clamors; yet He yielded to them and chose them a king, but warned them that they would suffer from his power. So far for the people of God. All the nations in those early times chose kings to govern them. By this simple choice the king enjoyed, in virtue of the contract made with his people, a perfectly legitimate power. But once constituted king, he had his power from God. The choice came through the people; the jurisdiction from God. "It is by me that kings reign" (Prov. viii.). And the prophet Daniel says: "The God of Heaven hath given to thee the kingdom of the earth" (Dan. iv.). And in the same chapter: "Thy kingdom shall remain to thee after thou shalt have known that power is from Heaven." So long, therefore, as this king rules his people for their good, he is the lawful king, and his orders must be obeyed. St. Paul, writing to the Romans (chap. xiii.) says: "Let every soul be subject to higher powers, for there is no power but from God, and those that are ordained of God. Therefore, he that resisteth, resisteth the ordinance of God. And they that resist purchase to themselves damnation."

But if a King should rule his people to their destruction, he becomes a tyrant, and loses all authority over them. Not indeed by one or two wicked or oppressive acts, or on account of any personal faults or sins, but by acts of tyranny destructive to the people's right and welfare. Power resides in the multitude for its own preservation, and for defending itself against enemies of this multitude. To effect this defence there must be a head, one in whom the powers of government can rest.

But the question which now arises is how to judge and determine when the King rules for the destruction of his people, and when therefore he loses his legitimate rights as sovereign. The judge of this is really the multitude. But the multitude is often divided into parties; one for the King and his Ministers, and the other against him. Hence we find the world deluged with blood and civil wars; the King maintaining his authority by the sword, and the people trying to assert their rights by revolution. In order to prevent bloodshed modern society has endeavored to find some international tribunal to settle disputes between kings and their subjects, and between governments at discord with one another. Kings are opposed to this. They say, "We'll take care of our own interests, and are the best judges in our own concerns." I fear the day is still far distant when such an empire will be chosen. In the middle ages the umpire between princes who considered themselves injured by one another, and between princes and their subjects, was the Pope as the head of Christendom. This was brought about by the constitution of the then existing society in Christendom, and not by any divine right inherent in the Papacy. Europe had been Christianized by the action of the Church. The princes were all Catholic rulers, and all acknowledged the head of the Church as the great spiritual father of Christendom. The princes looked upon him as their common father, and as their arbiter in disputes. Christian people looked upon the Pope as the Christian lawgiver, and as their protector against the tyranny of their rulers. It was for him to decide when the king or emperor, by his tyrannical and oppressive acts, lost his right of ruling. When princes appealed to him against one another he, as umpire, decided their case. In the middle of the eleventh century Andrew of Hungary, when besieged in his capital, brought Leo IX., the reigning Pontiff, to use his influence with the besieger Henry II., that he might be induced to accept equitable terms. The Pope hastened into Germany for this purpose, and succeeded in inducing Henry to withdraw his forces with certain conditions. These conditions the King violated, and was censured by the Church for his bad faith and injustice.

Another instance of greater interest is found in the case of Harold II. of England, and William the Conqueror. Their claims to the throne of England were referred to the Pope, Alexander II. Matthew of Paris, has related the incident in the following terms:—"William Duke of Normandy, lest the justice of his cause should be injured by rashness in making war, sent ambassadors to Pope Alexander, that his undertaking might be confirmed by apostolic authority. The Pope, having taken into consideration the claims of both contending parties, sent a banner to William as an oron of royal power."

The ruling kings of Christendom take an oath at their coronation that they will govern their subjects with justice and mercy, and that they will respect the liberties of the Church, that is, will allow Bishops to govern the people in the spiritual order. If, on their side, they break this oath and become tyrants, then the compact is broken, and the people on their side are also freed. Throughout Christendom, before the Reformation, Catholic kings, by their oath of coronation, were to be Catholics, and were supposed to remain so. Thus, when a prince fell away and was excommunicated by the Church, deposition was the ordinary consequence; and the Pope, in pronouncing the excommunication, could pronounce also the deposition—just as I presume would happen at the present time with Protestant rulers. The reigning sovereign, in England, for instance, must be a Protestant, and must protect the Protestant religion. Change of religion would be speedily followed by an act of deposition. In England the tribunal which determines whether the reigning sovereign loses his right of governing, by acts of tyranny or non-fulfillment of his oath of office, is the Lords and Commons, as representing the entire people of England. But through the middle ages by consent of the princes of Europe, the Pope was appointed arbiter between princes and peoples, and the Pope, in the discharge of his duties as such, could declare, and from time to time has declared, subjects no longer bound by their oath of allegiance on account of the tyranny of their princes. This declaration was expressed, sometimes by a dispensation, dispensing the people from their oath of allegiance to satisfy scrupulous consciences. But there was no reason for dispensation, properly so called, when a monarch fell from his legitimacy by habitual acts of cruelty and by tyranny. The Pope was looked upon as a good father and as the protector of the oppressed. We have instances of this in the case of Gregory VII and Henry IV, tyrant of Germany. Henry's debaucheries covered with shame the noblest families of Germany. Extortions and oppressions of the people, and the ruin of religion by the destruction of churches and the expulsions of the clergy, and the violation of all the rights both sacred and natural of the people marked Henry's reign as the most oppressive that Germany had seen. "The people loved liberty, and are certainly not to be blamed for doing what God and nature permit under such circumstances—revolt against the tyrant. The Pope, the greatest lover of liberty and of the rights of the people, entreated Henry to give up his vices, threatening him with deposition, and the judgments of God should he not change his manner of life: This the Pontiff frankly represented; but when his entreaties and admonitions were not followed, he pronounced the King a tyrant fallen from his royalty. In the usual form he absolved the people from their allegiance; or rather declared that allegiance was no longer expected of them. It had long been merited by the King's tyranny. Is there anything wrong in this? Is this against the common weal? Does that crush the power of the people or the rights of the prince? No; it only punishes the wicked. And thus the Pope has acted in other similar cases. The King has the right of honourable success; both for himself and the necessary officers of his government."

ment so long as he governs according to the stipulations of his oath; if he fails; to do so, the contract is broken and he becomes a simple individual. We have seen, therefore, that it is lawful to oppose civil power when that power turns oppressor. Hence when St. Paul says, "He who resisteth the power resisteth the ordinance of God," he speaks of legitimate power legitimately exercised. Otherwise the Apostle would pronounce that the tyrant had a right to obedience and the robber a right to plunder.

1. The next question that comes up is:—"Are we pledged to obey the civil power when it commands something evil?" We can't obey parents; much less the civil authority; in such a case. The Apostles said:—"We must obey God rather than man."

2. Again, "Are we obliged to obey the civil power when it commands things not under its jurisdiction; for instance, to practice certain religious tenets?" No, except when disobedience to such tenets would disturb the well being of society and were not against the laws of God. The faculties of civil power are confined to matters purely temporal and pertaining to the well-being of the State. It cannot even usurp the faculties of parents in the government and management of families. So the laws of Lycurgus, which declared that the children belonged to the State and should be educated as the State deemed proper, exceeded their bounds and were consequently useless. The State, as head of authority, can, however, oblige parents to perform their duties towards their children in the temporal order. If the parents are truly unable to fulfil those duties, the State has the right of seeing to the welfare of its subjects, and of providing for the proper training of the child who is to become one of its members; it becomes even its duty, in certain cases; for if the child be not properly educated, it will disturb society by its depredations.

3. "Who is to judge the limits of civil law? Who is to pronounce when laws are just and when unjust?" The civil rulers say that they have full right to declare what laws are binding and what not, and how far their laws can affect consciences. The Catholic Church and right reason say that Divine authority alone can pronounce infallibly what is right and what is wrong in the spiritual and moral order; and that that Divine authority on earth resides in the Church. The Church is the depository of all truth, because Christ has said: "I will send you the Paraclete, the spirit of truth." "But when He the spirit of truth is come He will teach you all truth." The Church must satisfy the yearnings of the most learned, that no human being can say, "I am looking for truth; and cannot find it." That civil authority is not the judge, in pronouncing on its own laws in certain matters, is sufficiently proved from the multitude of examples wherein laws have been repealed, because unjust and oppressive, and not gaining their ends, though civil authority when enacting them had declared those laws just and equitable. The Church, of course, has nothing to do with laws of a strictly and purely temporal bearing. She does not pronounce, for instance, on the law for the building of a ship or drilling an army. The right of pronouncing on such laws is vested in the multitude or its representatives.

4. "Can civil law enact anything contrary to Divine law?" No. So that when pagan tyrants ordered sacrifices to be offered up to idols, Christians were bound not to obey the law. In China, where the civil authority enacted that the Christians were to offer sacrifices to the gods of the country, they disobeyed them and suffered martyrdom. We are to render to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and to God the things that are God's. But we are not to render to Cæsar the things that are God's. Hence when Bismarck commands Bishops to give up their right of governing priests in the spiritual order, they cannot render that obedience, because it would be rendering to Cæsar that which is God's. God has given directly to the pastors of His Church the power of governing that Church. He says to them: "All power is given to me in Heaven and on earth. Go ye, therefore, teach all nations. . . . He that heareth you heareth me." To princes of the earth He has not addressed such language. They receive their powers indirectly from God and through the people. The power comes from God; the election and power come from God, Christ said to His Apostles: "You have not chosen me, but I have chosen you, and have appointed you." Of this privilege the world is very jealous, with the jealousy of Esau against his brother Jacob. But the fact lies open in the sacred volume of the Bible, and is the will of God.

The people have their rights and liberties conceded them by God himself. They can give up a portion of that liberty for the purpose of maintaining order. But when this public order becomes general confusion by abuse of power in the head, man assumes all his own rights. An unjust law does not bind in conscience. It is rather a corruption of law, as St. Thomas calls it. But if the tyrant should endeavor to enforce the unjust law by his army, the people have the right of resisting him. But then prudence may forbid any such resistance. Prudence is a cardinal virtue, and to fail against it is to commit a grievous sin. It would be a great imprudence and a grievous fault for an unarmed people to resist a tyrant backed by a numerous and well appointed army; and hence prudence forbids an oppressed people to rebel, 1st. When there is no likelihood of the overthrow of the tyrant, for otherwise he would become more tyrannical and oppress the people more grievously, and consequently their resistance produce more harm than good; 2nd, if the people are not prepared to substitute a government better than the one they overthrow.

In England the constitution admirably provides for revolutions, peacefully and quietly, and without bloodshed. The people govern through the King and the two Houses of Parliament. If the people, represented, by the members, are not satisfied with the laws made by the King, Lords and Commons then the Government finds itself in a minority, and resigns its right to govern. Hence our peaceful revolutions. The King reigns, but the people govern themselves through laws enacted by themselves for the public good, but having their authority for their enforcement from the King. The members of the old Parliament will return to their constituencies, and a new election of lawgivers will take place; and the majority governs always.

In other countries, where the sovereign is sole lawgiver, the majority of the people, if rightfully displeased with his laws, strive to dethrone him.—He on his part endeavors to maintain his position as King, and hence we have a revolution or a civil war. Kings are not supreme in the sense that they are above all law or right. Their supreme law is to govern for the public good, and a party or a portion only of his subjects who become disaffected have not the right of dethroning him. That right is inherent in the majority of the people, and not in a party. Hence secret societies, which are supposed to be only a part of the public, are condemned by the Church. It is unlawful for individuals to put to death a tyrant. The Council of Constance (Sess. xv.) condemned the following proposition as heretical:—"Any vassal or serf may lawfully and meritoriously kill any tyrant." Mark that the proposition is of individuals. It does not say the multitude cannot put to death their tyrant. The people cannot, however, employ an assassin to execute its decrees. The tyrant must be judged justly. To allow individuals to dethrone a tyrant would be to open the door to all kinds of excesses, and the most just of monarchs might fall by the hand of an assassin.

Hereditary Kings have the rights of the first King, together with his obligations. His people have their rights, and the people also elected, or adopted, a King moreover, they are bound to him by the same obligations of loyalty and allegiance as the remembrance of the protection and good government accorded by the Prince; or we may put it this way—the people vote the King large supplies of honor and respect and money, and in return are to get good government and respect for their rights and liberties. If the prince fails in his duty by breaking his promise of governing for the general good, he forfeits his right to the allegiance of his people; not, as I have said, by one or two, or even by a dozen tyrannical facts, but by a general color of tyranny.

An individual has the right to self-preservation, even at the expense of taking away the life of another who has unjustly attacked him. Society has the same right. When a society is attacked by another, it has the right of repelling the attack, and consequently of making war. An unlawful power or unjust usurpation cannot lay claim to the duty of allegiance. Legitimate power alone has that right; otherwise tyranny would be supreme. All persons, in self-preservation, are obliged to obey a tyrant when to resist would be death without gain. Hence they must acquiesce in a *de facto* government in order to preserve their own lives, as well as the private and public liberties. A *de facto* government, in the beginning illegitimate and tyrannical, may become a legitimate power by good government and the acquiescence of the people. This teaching of the Church does not favor tyrants nor does it crush liberties. The public interest of the country must be the dominant interest and study of the Governor, and not his own or his family's, or the interest of another country, but the interest of the people that are governed. When a tyrant feels the position weak from his own acts, then he endeavors to protect himself by harassing laws, and therefore oppresses still more his people. He is therefore governing for his own good and not for the good of society, for the preservation of a part and not for the preservation of the people; which is rank tyranny and injustice. We see, then, that such a tyrannical prince must be obeyed, not on account of the obligations of conscience, but from prudential motives, for fear of the sword and of causing greater evil.

We have said that the civil power has not the power of binding in religious matters. It must leave the Church perfectly free, for it is God's kingdom on earth. Our Divine Lord did not ask permission from the ruling powers to institute His Apostles to establish His Church, or to send His Apostles to preach. He did not tell His Apostles to ask permission of the secular powers to ordain others or to excommunicate those who deserved that punishment, or to prescribe to them what theology they are to preach to the people. Thus then the Falk laws, instituted in Germany, usurp the power and function of the Bishops, and dare to arrogate to themselves the right of appointing pastors to the Church, and of controlling the actions of the Bishops in enforcing its discipline. Hence those laws are not binding on conscience. They are usurpations rather than laws, and the German clergy have to obey God rather than man. Would the Protestant clergy of this country submit to the dictation of a Prime Minister their whole curriculum of discipline, that no lawful minister could be ordained or preach without the permission of the Attorney-General, or that the Church of England Bishops could not exercise any of their functions of supervision without the permission of an infidel Prime Minister? The Catholic Church has known other persecutions and has triumphed before, and will triumph again.

Catholics are obliged in conscience to obey even a Pagan ruler in all things pertaining to the public good and order; but when he commands things against faith and right they are not to obey, and hence the millions of martyrs who laid down their lives rather than obey unjust rulers, ordering them to sacrifice to the gods of the empire, the rulers saying these were the laws of the empire, and they ought to be obedient to them. Henry VIII. made it a law that he should be called head of the Church, and that to deny it was to be guilty of an offence against the laws of the State. But the legislator passed the bounds of his power in enacting them; hence they were not laws. The Irish for centuries have been obliged at the point of the bayonet to pay tithes to Protestant ministers whose services they could not in conscience accept. That law was an unjust law, and resistance to it was permitted, though prudence forbade it to prevent greater evil. The law, too, obliging them to go to Protestant churches and to listen to Protestant service was an unjust law, and they resisted it, though the forfeiture of lands and property was the penalty.

His Grace concluded by saying in answer to "An Honest Enquirer after Truth," who had asked if it is true, as stated by Rev. Mr. Robb, that St. Augustine taught that Purgatory did not exist, that the quotation in Mr. Robb's lecture "is quite faulty.—A sentence is left out that changes the sense. St. Augustine in his Confessions recommends the soul of his mother to the prayers of his friends. So with other matters in that Rev. gentleman's lecture."

ecclesiastical history brought to bear upon the question, and so long as they shall do so "Anti-Janus" will furnish powerful weapons to combat and overthrow such insidious misrepresentations. "Anti-Janus" possesses a permanent value. To have made it accessible to the English reader, as you have done in your admirable translation, is not the least of the many services rendered to the cause of Catholic truth by the translator of Mechlitz's "Symbolism." I beg to remain, my dear Mr. Robertson, very faithfully yours,

FATHER LEAHY, Archbishop of Cashel, J. B. Robertson, Esq., Professor, &c., Catholic University, Dublin.

THE DUBLIN "FREEMAN'S JOURNAL" ON TYNDALL.

Professor Tyndall re-appears in the character of *amicus humani generis*—the self-constituted champion of humanity against its Creator. A new edition of his now notorious address before the British Association at Belfast contains a revised preface, in which he endeavors to reply to some of the attacks made upon his materialistic propaganda. His supplementary vindication seems to have been in part inspired by Mr. Gladstone's recent performance. He follows that statesman into the domain of religious controversy, and deliberately turns out of his way to make an unnecessary and perfectly untrue assertion respecting the doctrine of Infallibility. It was charged against the Professor that he tried to wriggle out of the position taken by him in his address, in the sort of explanation he prefixed to the published issue of it. This charge was not made by the Catholics alone—it was made by all of other creeds who made public comment upon the alternations of phrase, the excisions and additions which fully justified it. But the Professor has singled out Catholicity for the fierce and offensive assault he now makes. Perhaps he shrewdly conceives that an onslaught upon a particular religion which is already assailed may furnish a safe cover for his attack upon all beliefs whatever. Professor Tyndall betrays a bitter sense of the uncompromising fashion in which his theories were condemned by the Irish guardians and teachers of Catholicity. He repeats his unmeaning prettiness about "the mild light of science" which was struck out of the published address, with an angry hint that, were it not "for the intelligence of Catholic laymen," positive restriction of "the power for evil" of the Catholic Church would be necessary. The professor declares he does not fear the charge of Atheism, nor would he even disavow it in reference to any definition of the "Supreme" which the Catholic Church would be likely to frame. He asserts that the "quibbles of the Athanasian Creed," the Pontigny pilgrimages, the dating of historic epochs from the definition of the Immaculate Conception, are "chimeras which astound all thinking men," and less in accordance with the "verities" which science has brought to light than "the reasonable views" promulgated by him at Belfast. Maral and religious feeling was his, he says, "without the intervention of dogma." He accepts "fearfully" the facts of Materialism. The Professor reiterates his proposition that in matter is to be found the promise and potency of every form and quality of life. We give a specimen of his reasoning:—

For aens the earth was unfit to maintain what we call life. It is now covered with visible living things. They are not formed of matter different from that of the earth round them; they are, on the contrary, bone of its bone and flesh of its flesh. How were they introduced? Was life implicated in the nebulae—as part, it may be, of a vaster, wholly unfathomable life—or is it the work of a Being standing outside the nebula, who fashioned it and vitalised it, but whose own origin and ways are equally past finding out? As far as the eye of science has hitherto ranged through nature, no intrusion of merely creative power into any series of phenomena has been observed. The assumption of such a power to account for special phenomena, though often made, has always proved a failure. It is opposed to the very spirit of science and I therefore assumed the responsibility of holding up in contrast with it that method of nature which it has been the vocation and triumph of science to disclose, and in the application of which we can alone hope for further light. Holding, then, that the nebula and the Solar system, life included, stand to each other in a relation resembling that of the germ to the finished organism, I re-affirm here—not arrogantly or defiantly, but without a shade of indistinctness—the position laid down in Belfast not with the vaqueness belonging to the emotions, but with the definiteness belonging to the understanding."

Professor Tyndall's *ens rationis* does not reject the creative hypothesis because he knows it to be untrue. Not at all. He only rejects it because certain people pretend that they know it to be true. This is exactly the meaning of his statement on the point. If these people, deluded believers in Divine revelation, are asked for the proofs upon which they believe in a Creator, what can they do? Hear Professor Tyndall:—

"They can do no more than point to the Book of Genesis or some other portion of the Bible. Profoundly interesting and indeed pathetic, to me are those attempts of the opening mind of man to appease his hunger for a cause. But the Book of Genesis has no voice in scientific questions. To the grasp of geology, which it resisted for a time, it at length yielded like potter's clay, its authority as a system of cosmogony being discredited on all hands by the abandonment of the obvious meaning of its writer. It is a poem—not a scientific treatise."

The Book of Genesis "or some other portion of the Bible" We would be disposed to apologise to our readers for printing this blasphemous rubbish did we believe that any sane individual would receive it with any other feelings than those of piety and contempt. The Professor is not even an original or entertaining performer upon the Materialistic trumpet. We might fill a page of this journal with the names of the fools who have rushed before him in upon this awful ground. They are sorry company with all the learning and brilliancy they shared among them, for any man held eminent in a Christian land. Their history is a solemn lesson, and ought to teach what he reaps who sows himself to disturb the spiritual consciousness of man, the inborn indestructible perception of a Creator and another being. Not a philosopher among all these could explain what it is makes a blade of grass grow. But they were able without hesitation to question the existence of God. Religion they hold to be "opposed to the spirit of science." Therefore religion and its teachings are false. So in effect contends Professor Tyndall, and in his contention deals most unfairly with matters which are not, in themselves proscribed by the Catholic Church, but are *malum prohibitum* only as they are "distorted and used as vehicles for the inculation of error and infidelity. Whatever miserable credit is due to the open profession of evil principle Professor Tyndall may ask. The man who proclaims war against the Creator, and the faith in which hundreds of millions find hope and comfort ought need courage, especially in a day when religious sentiment is so vehemently expressed. Yet we should not be surprised if the Professor's outrage upon Christianity were largely condoned on account of the specific character of the portion of it. All believers, whatever be the variations of their belief, cling steadfastly and reverently to the convictions which "lead through darkness up to God." Professor Tyndall, with well-considered artfulness, vents the wrathful "spirit of science" directly upon the Catholic Church. It will be lamentable if his device should blind the members of other communions to the general scope of his attack.

GLADSTONE, "ANTI-JANUS," AND THE VATICAN COUNCIL.

We (Dublin Freeman) have much pleasure in publishing the subjoined highly complimentary notes which have been received by the accomplished author of "Anti-Janus":—

59 Eccles-street, Dublin, April, 1871. MY DEAR PROFESSOR ROBERTSON—I beg to thank you most sincerely for the copy of your translation of the "Anti-Janus" of Dr. Hergenrother, which you have so kindly forwarded to me. You could scarcely have chosen for translation any work better suited to illustrate the important questions which are so often discussed in the non-Catholic and rationalistic publications of the present day. Those enemies of the Holy See, who, in Germany, or nearer home, sought to obstruct the great work of the Vatican General Council, appealed chiefly in support of their vain theories, to the facts of history, which they misrepresented and distorted in a thousand ways, and in the anonymous "Janus" was skillfully compressed all the venom of these attacks. Dr. Hergenrother, in his "Anti-Janus," presents an antidote against the erroneous statements of the assailants of Rome, setting forth in true light the important historic facts which were travestied and falsified by them. You have rendered a great service to our Catholic public by your excellent translation of this admirable work, which, I trust, will be widely circulated among our people.—Wishing you many years to continue to enrich our literature with such important Catholic Works, I remain, with great esteem, your faithful servant,

J. B. Robertson, Esq. Thurles, March 26, 1871. MY DEAR MR. ROBERTSON—It gives me much pleasure to find that your excellent translation of Dr. Hergenrother's work, "Anti-Janus," has been so favorably reviewed, not only in Catholic, but even in Protestant journals. Whilst impartial judges, whatever their creed, will concur in this favorable opinion of your translation, Catholics must acknowledge themselves deeply indebted to you for having placed in the hands of the English reader so able a refutation of a very bad book, so powerful a vindication of what is now an article of our faith. Nor let it be said that "Anti-Janus" comes too late, now that the Vatican Council has decided the great question discussed in its pages. It is never too late to defend the truth. The question of the Infallibility of the Pope, speaking *ex cathedra*, has, no doubt, been decided for all time to come, and no true Catholic can appeal from the decision. But as Catholic and anti-Catholic writers will it may be assumed to be a question of the facts of ecclesiastical history brought to bear upon the question, and so long as they shall do so "Anti-Janus" will furnish powerful weapons to combat and overthrow such insidious misrepresentations. "Anti-Janus" possesses a permanent value. To have made it accessible to the English reader, as you have done in your admirable translation, is not the least of the many services rendered to the cause of Catholic truth by the translator of Mechlitz's "Symbolism." I beg to remain, my dear Mr. Robertson, very faithfully yours,

FATHER LEAHY, Archbishop of Cashel, J. B. Robertson, Esq., Professor, &c., Catholic University, Dublin.

THE ARCHBISHOP OF TORONTO ON THE Deposing of Tyrants by the Pope.

The Archbishop of Toronto delivered a lecture in St. Michael's Cathedral, on Sunday evening, 17th inst., on the question of the deposing of tyrants by the Pope, as Head of Christendom, or by the people as Makers of Kings.

His Grace commenced by saying that the Catholic Church was accused of being the friend and protector of tyrants, and the crusher of the liberties of the people; and again, the friend of revolution, and abettor of conspiracies against secular power. The Catholic Church was neither. It was no friend of tyranny, but rather the protector of the true liberties of the people, and the legitimate authority of the ruling powers of this world. He then proceeded as follows:—

Before entering on our subject we must lay down certain general principles concerning society. God created man and woman to His image and likeness, as the root of society. Man was born for society. Hence a number of families springing from one stock formed a community, at the head of which was the oldest father, or grandfather, or great-grandfather. This, the oldest of all governments, is called the patriarchal. This was of Divine institution in the order of nature.

The Patriarch, by his Divine as well as natural right settled all discussion and looked after the common interests of his community, composed of his descendants, direct and collateral. But these families becoming more numerous, the people became more wicked, and no longer wished to obey the orders of the Patriarch, alleging, perhaps that he was more favorable to one branch of the family than to another, though he might be supposed to love all his children alike. Then scattering over the earth, they, as a rule, chose, or at least received, the Monarchical form of Government, both as an approach in form to the patriarchal, and as best suited to their wants. A king then was chosen, with officers and an army, to repress and punish wickedness, and to preserve the citizens—that is, the members of the community—in their rights and liberties against internal divisions and external aggressions. Among the people of God the patriarchal form of government lasted for about 2,400 years. (From God chose for His people a lawgiver and prophet holding authority directly from Himself. Hence this government was called Theocracy.)