

vanquish withal. We do not tolerate Falsehoods, Thieveries, Iniquities, when they fasten on us; we say to them, Thou art false; thou art not tolerable! We are to extinguish falsehoods and to put an end to them, in some wise way."

Nor has Carlyle, in the trio—Falsehoods, Thieveries, Iniquities—exhausted the intolerable things. We do not tolerate injustice, disloyalty, anarchic tendencies, or official stupidity, against which it has been said "even the gods fight in vain." We say to them "Get thee behind me; thou art false; thou art not tolerable." What a genuine ring there is about the words of the sage of Chelsea! There is a false—hate it, exclude it, destroy it. There is a right—a true—search for it, and treasure it up when you find it. It is hard to find, as all truth is; but it exists; it is worth the toil and sweat and tears and blood of the search.

Contrast with this Mr. Ewart's doctrine. My right is your wrong; my wrong is your right. One for me is as good as the other for you. There is no fixed right. There is no hope of reaching a common standard.

Surely this is what Mr. Ewart means, for he says: "If we cannot decide (and Mr. Ewart says we cannot decide) whether the opinions are harmful or innocent, A has as much right to have his way as B, has he not?" (Page 362.) Or again, "Your opinions are not entitled to one whit greater deference or respect than are the opinions of others." (Page 361.)

Plainly Mr. Ewart believes there is no common standard of opinion; that there can be no consensus of right; that there can be no invariable moral principle in man which can serve as a basis of agreement, and hence of truth.

That being the case, then each must be allowed to believe and act as he likes. One man's opinion may be harmful to society, but the man says it isn't so. His opinion is as good as mine.

He must have liberty. Society is thus debarred from interference with him. Absolute, unrestrained liberty to do as he may choose must be given him. To the mind of the writer, these are the elementary principles of anarchy.

In making this statement, the writer is not condemning Mr. Ewart; who is a prominent and useful member of our Winnipeg community, but simply stating the inevitable drift of the opinions advanced by Mr. Ewart, for he says: "Religious and irreligious opinion is in the category of the debatable; the true policy with reference to all such questions is perfect liberty": or again, "In the name of liberty, I would say to the parents, certainly you have a right to teach, or have taught, to your children anything you like, so long as you can agree about it."

Now it is the contention of the writer, in opposition to these views:

1. That *the state has a right to form and enforce an opinion of its own at variance with the opinions of many of its subjects*, or, in other words, where it sees cause to disregard the "perfect liberty" claimed by Mr. Ewart. A few instances may suffice. The state may rightly insist on the education of all the children in it, whether the parents approve or disapprove. Ignorance is a public danger: the prejudice of a parent in favor of illiteracy may not be permitted. Mr. Ewart is compelled to admit this, when he says: "But at the same time liberty does not require that children should be allowed to grow up entirely illiterate;" though he had just stated that "Liberty requires that children should not be taught isms to which their parents are opposed," knowing perfectly well that one of the commonest isms or prejudices many people have is resistance to the education of their children. The state may compel vaccination, although, as every one knows, a good many of the inhabitants of the province of Quebec are as much opposed, in the very presence of small-