may desire, and returning those at the head of the poll. The effect of this provision is that in a constituency returning three members, one-third of the electorate plus one, can, by concentrating their votes on one man, place him amongst the three highest on the poll. Thus, in a constituency with an electorate of 1,000 and returning three members, the cumulative votes of 334 electors would amount to 1,002, while it would be impossible for the remaining 666 electors, by any distribution whatever of their 1,998 votes to poll a larger number of votes on behalf of three other candidates. The system is certainly much superior to that of the 'restricted vote,' as it is capable of much wider extension. Under it each constituency is divisible into as many equal parts as there are members to be elected, and each part is capable of electing one of them, as may be seen by applying the above rule to constituencies returning any given number of representatives with each elector possessing as many votes as there are members to be elected.

The cumulative vote has been adopted in the election of school-boards in England, and of the House of Representatives in the State of Illinois. In the latter instance it was tried for the first time in 1872, and the result seems to have afforded almost universal satisfaction to all parties. There were fifty-one districts, each returning three members to the House and one to the Senate. In the election of the former the cumulative vote was used; in that of the latter of course not, so that the two systems were tested simultaneously. The Republicans carried thirty-three districts, and the Democrats eighteen; under the old system the former would have elected ninety-nine mem-The total bers, and the latter fifty-four. Republican vote was 240,837, and the total Democrat vote 187,250. According to their proportionate numbers the former were entitled to eighty-five members, and the latter to sixty-eight. The actual result was the return of eighty-six Republicans and sixty-seven Democrats. But in the Senate, elected by majorities, the Republicans carried thirty-three seats and the Democrats only eighteen, though according to their proportionate numbers the former should have had twenty-nine and the latter twenty-two. In the House the share of representation possessed by each party was

almost exactly identical with the proportion of the electorate supporting it; as is proved by the fact that we have there 2,800 Republican votes to each Republican member, and 2,790 Democratic votes to each Democratic member. But in the Senate the fact was directly the reverse. There a division of the total Republican vote by the number of Republican Senators elected gives about 7,500 votes to each; while a division of the Democratic vote by the number of Democratic Senators elected gives 10,400 votes to each. In other words: under the cumulative system a vote proved almost exactly as powerful in obtaining representation on one side as on the other; but under that of election by majorities, two Republican were almost as powerful as three Democratic votes.* These results seem almost decisively to demonstrate that large advantages may be expected to flow from the substitution of the cumulative vote, even on the smallest scale possible, for our present system of election.

In the election of the English schoolboards the result has been more mixed than in Illinois. In Birmingham, for instance, where there were fifteen members to be returned, the Liberal party started a ticket of fifteen candidates; and although they polled for it 220,638 votes against 214,445 polled for other candidates, they succeeded in electing only six of the fifteen members, and 124,211 Liberal votes were useless and ineffectual, having no operation whatever owing to their having been distributed amongst nine candidates none of whom had sufficient votes to be returned. And in other constituencies somewhat similar results ensued. But the cause of these results is perfectly clear, and is to be found in the fact that the majority refused to recognise the change which the cumulative vote had produced. They sought, as in old times, to elect all the members; and by so *doing* failed to elect as many as they might have done had they accepted the situation and concentrated their majority of votes on a majority of candidates instead of distributing them among all returnable. They had failed fully to realise the fact that with fifteen members to be elected, and each elector

^{*}See 'The Election of Representatives.' By Thomas Hare. Appendix O.