

ously wrought out by such a brilliant writer as D'Aubigne have been proved fallacious! Whatever may be affirmed in regard to "the Philosophy of Protestantism" here, at all events, we fear we have a characteristic specimen of the Logic of Romanism.

We shall say nothing more on this point. We wish, however, that we had space and time to set forth our vindication of the Protestant idea of the Reformation. Our present duty is to confine our attention to the arguments before us, and so we pass on with the author to consider the three remaining accounts of the movement in question.

The first of these need not detain us very long. That such events as Luther's disappointment or Henry's divorce can in any sense be termed causes of the vast movement which was spreading throughout Europe contemporaneously with them, only the narrowest and most superficial of thinkers would assert. These events were only the occasions of that movement, and were not its causes. What, we would ask, had Luther's indulgencies to do with the Reformation in England, or in France, or in Switzerland, and what had Henry's divorce to do with that movement in Germany? To the credit of the writer it must be said he does not assert, as so many have done, that these trivial and circumscribed events were the sole causes of such a world-wide influence. His position is that they are to be numbered *among* the causes of that event.

Even this, however, we cannot allow. The causes of a movement which spread through so many different countries and among so many nationalities, have to be sought among those influences which were common to them all. The events in question were only the occasions of those particular phases of the movement developed in the countries in which they occurred.

The second of the Roman Catholic views of the subject, traces the Refor-

mation, as we have already said, "to a general repugnance to spiritual authority and a spirit of independence of at least two centuries growth." In considering this account, the point at issue should be carefully borne in mind. It is that the Reformation was based on vicious principles. Now, granting for a moment that the above account is a correct one, does that fact, we ask, prove that the religious movement of the sixteenth century was based on vicious principles? Certainly not. For as we have already pointed out, neither repugnance to authority, no matter whether it be of a spiritual or a temporal character, nor a spirit of independence can ever be justly termed a vicious principle, unless it be first proved that the authority in question is a legitimate and rightful one, and the independence sought, an injurious or dangerous one. The writer, here and elsewhere throughout his article, admits that there was an universal feeling of repugnance to spiritual authority, or--as he ought more explicitly to have said--to that particular sort of spiritual authority then in vogue, and this he terms the cause of the Reformation. Now, we maintain that this feeling or spirit alluded to, was not the cause of that movement, but that very movement itself. We maintain that it is this very feeling, this very sentiment, that has to be accounted for, since it constitutes one, though certainly not all of the principal features of the Reformation. The world had no repugnance to spiritual authority simply as such, but only to that supremacy which the Papacy appropriates to its selfish ends, under the pretext of Divine authority. This second account then, of itself, gives us no insight into the real causes of the Reformation, and, as we have shown already, even if it did, it does not, of itself, prove that that movement was founded on vicious principles. The writer evidently saw this himself, for after describing in a few brief sentences the state of "the spiritual commonwealth of nations" in En-