formulated by the Council. In the future the meaning of the article might be left to some court of international lawyers, whose decision might place us in an awkward position.

Lord Robert Cecil replied that, on the contrary, the document would be interpreted by the Governments themselves. Each State must adopt the plans formulated before any would be bound; there must be unanimity not only in the Council but as between the Governments, that is, unless all the members of the League adopted the plans none of them was committed. The whole document was subject to the principle that unless there was something to take away the sovereignty of a Government in a particular matter sovereignty remained.

Lord Sinha and Sir Robert Borden pointed to the word "consideration", and said that the word "action" simply meant that each Government would have to determine whether to adopt the plans or not. This power was clearly reserved to the Governments, and the word "action" could not be tortured into implying an obligation.

Mr. Massey enquired what then became of the League of Nations.

Sir Robert Borden agreed that this might well be considered the real criticism of the article. If reduction of armaments throughout the world must wait upon the operation of this article we might wait till Doomsday.

## Article 11

Lord Robert Cecil said that the second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 11 had been added to the original draft at the suggestion of the French. It authorised the Secretary-General, on the request of any member of the League in time of emergency, to summon a meeting of the Council, and it clearly added to the effectiveness of the League.

## Article 15

Lord Robert Cecil pointed out that Article 15 had been largely redrafted in order to make it clearer. In the sixth paragraph of the article a clause had been added reserving to the members of the League, where the Council failed to reach a unanimous report, the right to take such action as they should consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice. Such a provision was clearly desirable in order to meet the possibility of an unjust combination of many States directed against some small country. The last paragraph of the article had been proposed by M. Veniselos¹ and the provision for majority voting had been necessary in order to prevent some small State in the Assembly from holding up the proceedings.

## Article 16

Sir Robert Borden pointed out that in the original draft the provisions of this Article became operative if any country should "break or disregard its covenants," while in the present draft they became operative only when a country should "resort to war in disregard of its covenants."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Président du Conseil des ministres de Grèce de 1917 à 1920; plénipotentiaire de la Grèce à la Conférence de la Paix.