

to give to nature, or depend on them. This, however, was a light too clear to agree with the sceptic's love of obscurity. He preferred to urge that human reason is, either altogether illusive, or at best only a law to itself and void of any authority higher than that of rational self-will.

Reason is neither illusive nor unwarranted. It carries its vouchers in its very nature, and its dictates cannot be rejected with impunity. Its veracity is abundantly confirmed by experience. Its authority is inherent; and this appears the more evident when we observe its right to command the will. "God" we confess, "hath endued the will of man with that natural liberty, that it is neither forced, nor by any absolute necessity of nature determined, to good or evil." Being voluntary agents we act freely; not always with deliberation, yet always spontaneously. But we ought also to act rightly. As in mathematics we are bound by the principles of arithmetic and geometry, in logic by the necessary conditions of thought, and in physics by the laws of force, so in morals we are bound by the rule of right. This, indeed, does not necessitate obedience, but it is obligatory, so that we cannot transgress it without sin. In fact, its authority over us we spontaneously, and often deliberately, assert; approving ourselves if we obey, condemning ourselves if we disobey. Hence, many acknowledging the authority of practical reason to legislate, have been disposed to regard the will as necessarily just and good. But will and reason do not necessarily agree. They