

well with determinism as with freedom. Indeed, we may claim, that only upon the supposition that a man's acts represent his character, and take place according to fixed laws, does there appear to be any hope of influencing him in any way. We may, perhaps, then assert, that if the retributory theory of punishment postulates freedom of alternatives, the reformatory conception demands as a presupposition, determinism. It is just because a man *cannot help* acting as he does, that he requires to be separated from society, and subjected to a special kind of treatment.

The distinctively moral argument is based on the feeling of obligation, and the retrospective judgments we pass on our own conduct. It is contained in Kant's famous statement, "the ought implies the can." Now it is urged with great force by some modern writers, that although, from the point of view of psychology, we cannot escape deterministic conclusions, yet the fact of morality compels us to postulate indeterminism. In other words, the recognition of an act as one which I ought to perform, implies ability on my part to perform it. The feeling of remorse, which is the consequence of the neglect of some duty, would be utterly vain and unmeaning, it is said, if I am so constituted as to be incapable of acting otherwise. "Either free will is a fact, or moral judgment a delusion." ¹ "Whatever may be the case with the intellectual problem, the facts which we call moral, the supreme facts of human existence, do, as Kant insisted, demand such reference to a freely acting personality." ²

If determinism really destroys our moral conceptions, we must admit that this is a strong argument against it. For it is undoubtedly true that the facts of our moral consciousness are as real and authoritative as any other facts of our life. I venture to think, however, that moral conceptions and facts will not be found incompatible with determinism. We may

¹ Martineau, *Types of Ethical Theory*, Vol. II., p. 141.

² J. Seth, *Freedom as Ethical Postulate*, p. 24.