

that will make it still more legitimate, impressive and convincing.

The position taken by Mr. Turner on the accord is in basic agreement with the statements he made over these last two years and the policies voted by the Liberal Party's national convention. I would say roughly the same for Mr. Broadbent and the New Democratic Party.

The five conditions set by Quebec to its concurrence to the 1982 constitutional agreement were put forward by Mr. Bourassa and the Quebec Liberal Party during the provincial elections, in December 1985. That was an integral part and a major component of his electoral platform. As we know, Mr. Bourassa and his colleagues received quite an impressive mandate at that election.

Since then, Quebec's premier and Minister Rémillard elaborated on many occasions on Quebec's five proposals. Notably in May of last year, at Mont-Gabriel.

Mr. Turner, for his part, publicly commented in a very open and positive way on Quebec's proposals. In particular, he gave a long interview to *Le Devoir* on June 13, 1986.

**Senator Frith:** The reference is always to process, rather than substance, as you promised.

**Senator Murray:** That involves the process that we just started in this house and in Parliament. It is very unfortunate indeed if my friend finds it hard to accept the information I am providing him.

Mr. Turner, as I said, commented publicly, in an open and positive way on Quebec's proposals, in an interview with *Le Devoir*, on June 13, 1986. That interview dealt with almost every component of the constitutional, Canada-Quebec matter.

On November 29 and 30 last, the National Convention of the Liberal Party adopted a number of resolutions concerning Quebec, the Constitution and even the Senate. There is therefore nothing surprising about Mr. Turner's support for the accord. In fact, the opposite would have been a surprise. I would have been most astonished had he opposed it.

[*English*]

Mr. Turner, of course, has taken the position that there are details in this accord that he thinks might have been done differently and, in his view, might have been done better. He intends, as is his right and duty, to draw attention to these matters in the course of the parliamentary proceedings. He has also made it clear, however, that the official position of his party is that its members will vote for the accord as it is at the end of the debate.

I raise these matters now not to discuss the affairs of the Liberal Party but because the point, the very important and essential point, that Mr. Turner has made touches upon the parliamentary process that we are discussing today. It seems to me that Mr. Turner recognizes, first, that whatever reservations he may have on certain details are outweighed by the attainment of the goal that we all share—the voluntary assent of Quebec to the Constitution. Put another way, his reservations on certain details are not such, he believes, as to justify

his attempting to block the achievement of Quebec's reintegration.

Second, as a practical matter, Mr. Turner knows that there will be a second round. It is provided for in the accord. Indeed, there will be annual conferences on the Constitution, during which some of the proposals he and others are now putting forward can be considered. He can use, and obviously intends to use, the parliamentary process we are now embarking on to have these proposals discussed in the hope that we might reach agreement on them at a future conference.

Third, he knows that if the present resolution does not pass Parliament and the legislatures, there will be no second round. Our constitutional evolution would continue to be blocked, or at least badly impeded, by the refusal of Quebec to participate in it.

Fourth, Mr. Turner knows that in the present process no Parliament, no legislature, can unilaterally effect a change in the resolution. Any amendment, unless it already enjoyed unanimous agreement, would require that we begin again at zero; that is, that we commence the process all over again. So he is, as a practical matter and as a matter of principle, prepared to make his points strongly this round and to vote for the resolution at the end of the day.

Fifth, of course—and here I may be stepping somewhat on to territory that is not my own—he has said, and properly and correctly so, that he is on the right side of history. I cannot but recall that, while attention is paid to dissenting voices from time to time, history will always judge in the near and the longer term where the leader and the party stood on such a matter. My mind goes back—not with a great deal of pleasure, but, nevertheless, it does go back—to the year 1969 when the Official Languages Act was going through Parliament. Mr. Stanfield and the large majority of his caucus voted in favour of the bill. Some 16 or 17 members stood in opposition to it. The experience did not destroy or ruin the Progressive Conservative Party. The large majority, in any case, stood together. What would have destroyed the Progressive Conservative Party for some time to come would have been if the leader of the caucus had officially been opposed or, worse, tried to equivocate on a matter of fundamental and national importance.

[*Translation*]

I referred earlier to the headline in *Le Devoir* of June 4, 1987—"Canada says yes to Quebec". It is my ardent hope there will never be cause to change that headline to read: "Canada says yes to Quebec, but Liberal senators say no."

[*English*]

The debate on the motion that is now before us has touched to a great extent on the different roles of the Senate and the House of Commons in constitutional amendment. It has been pointed out that our roles are different, and that we in the Senate have only a suspensive veto. As honourable senators know, our powers, in principle at least, are virtually equal to those of the House of Commons in most other respects. It follows, it seems to me, that those who framed the Constitu-