

*External Affairs*

experiments and use our influence whenever we can to prevent this danger becoming more and more imminent.

The third matter, of course, to which the hon. member for Prince Albert also referred, is the publication of the American-taken notes, for such they were, of the Yalta conference and the statements that were made there and, indeed, the foreshadowing of further American-made notes of the conferences at Tehran and Potsdam.

The speech made by the Secretary of State for External Affairs at Toronto contains expressions that at this time seem to me to have been inadvisable, and inadvisable under the circumstances because they could be subjected to interpretations which could have meant a change of policy in regard to the Formosan situation. I have the text of the minister's speech here, and he said:

Our position in this regard is something that we should never forget when we say, and correctly, that certain United States commitments, those, for instance, covering help to Chiang Kai-shek in Formosa and certain Chinese coastal islands, have not been accepted by us. But that is not the same thing as saying that they may not involve us. And it is certainly not the same as saying that they do not concern us.

In this paragraph the minister stated that United States commitments have not been accepted by Canada, and he repeated that, I am glad to say, this afternoon. But he did say that the commitments by the United States might involve us in the consequences of those commitments; and at other points in the address we have the same sort of thought. He said:

The neutrality of either of us, if the other were engaged in a major war in which its very existence were at stake, would be unthinkable.

Perhaps the minister is right. Perhaps if they were engaged in a major war it would involve us automatically, because of our geographical position with them. Nevertheless I do not think it is wise, in the state of opinion in the United States today, to make statements of that description and have them published in the press of that country. That can be construed as an assurance of our support should the United States be involved in what is, in effect, a major war on the mainland of China.

In the concluding portion of his address he went even farther when he said this:

In any major war we—

That is the United States and Canada.—must be on the same side.

He then pointed out what he called the moral of this, saying:

This is not that we should be less Canadian, but that we should do everything we possibly can to censure that Canada's influence and Canada's

[Mr. Coldwell.]

policy, especially in its relations with the United States, will be directed toward the avoidance of conflict, political and economic. The same of course applies to the United States.

With that statement one can have no quarrel, and of it one can make no criticism. But I wish to suggest this, that the Canadian people want our government to state forthrightly and without equivocation that we will do everything we possibly can to ensure that Canada's influence and Canada's policy, especially in its relations with the United States, will be directed toward the avoidance of conflict, political and economic.

There is evidence that the government is taking a stronger attitude with regard to the economic relationships of our country with the United States. This in my opinion is being taken belatedly. The hon. member for Prince Albert (Mr. Diefenbaker) said that this afternoon. It should have been done when the United States took unilateral action against some of our farm commodities. But the statement made by the Minister of Trade and Commerce (Mr. Howe) yesterday is the kind of forthright statement that needs to be made by the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) regarding political matters in which we are directly interested and gravely concerned.

Judging by the statements by the United States secretary of state, Mr. Dulles, the issue in his opinion—and he stated it over and over again—is between the government of Chiang Kai-shek, which he calls the Republic of China, and which he placed before the world as a desirable ally, and that of the Peking government which he regards not only as a usurper but as an outcast.

I could quote stronger terms than Mr. Dulles used. How many Canadians or Americans understand why the Chinese people drove Chiang Kai-shek out of China? A few days ago I reread a speech made in this house by the hon. member for Lambton-Kent (Mr. MacKenzie), who was for some time in China with UNRRA. He told the house some of the reasons why the government was overthrown. Let me quote the hon. member as he is reported at page 1878 of *Hansard* for November 17, 1949:

While I know nothing about the personal integrity of Chiang Kai-shek, I understand from his friends that it is quite good; nevertheless I know that his government officials practised a policy of graft and corruption that was incredible to me. I have also visited many cities of China and met many merchants. I met Colonel Kearney of the United States army, who was stationed there. He told me about many things that happened in the Chinese army which to me were inconceivable. When I went to China I understood that it was one of the great democracies of the world. According to my understanding and appraisal of democracy, it was as far removed from the