

vention by the nations of Europe in Spanish affairs. In its appeal the French government said that its purpose was "for the rapid adoption and rigorous observance in regard to Spain of the common rules of non-intervention." But even at that time the French government was well aware that the Spanish rebels were being armed from the outside, and so at the end of its appeal it made it perfectly clear that it was reserving to itself the right of application in regard to the decision.

The farce of non-intervention dragged on month after month, with Germany and Italy, and their ally Portugal, stalling and hedging on every proposal to make the non-intervention pact effective. On July 30, 1937, a year after the non-intervention pact was formed, a year in which the government of Canada had had ample opportunity to see quite clearly that the non-intervention pact was in reality a screen for intervention on the side of the rebels by Italy and Germany, a year in which Canada's delegates to Geneva had every opportunity to hear the plea of the Spanish delegates for the right of their government to buy military supplies to put down rebellion against constituted authority according to the commonly accepted rules of international law. A year after our government had had the opportunity to see all this and did see all this, an embargo was placed by Canada on the export of arms and munitions to Spain. The government of Canada knew that Germany and Italy were supplying the Spanish rebels with arms and men, but there was no embargo placed on arms to Italy and Germany.

Let us contrast the action of the Canadian government in this affair with its action in another affair. In the Abyssinian affair this government objected to oil sanctions being imposed against Italy for fear they might lead to reprisals or to war, but this government was not afraid that our arms embargo against Spain might lead to war. Why? Because Spain is a weak nation. The conclusions which we can draw, then, from the difference in the policy of the Canadian government upon these two occasions is that if a nation is strong enough to retaliate it can carry on all the aggression it likes against weak nations; but if a nation is weak, if there is no danger of retaliation, the government of Canada will refuse it an opportunity even to defend itself. In the case of Spain it does not seem to have made any difference to the Canadian government that the Spanish people were and are defending their homes, defending their families, their institutions, and everything that they as well as we hold dear.

I have said that the government of Canada had an opportunity to hear the plea of the Spanish delegates to the League of Nations Assembly at Geneva. The Spanish government laid its case before the league in September, 1936, very shortly after the trouble started; again in December, 1936, again in May, 1937, and again in September, 1937. It may have taken its case to Geneva on other occasions, but I did not take the time to look them all up.

Now I should like to put before this committee the proposals made by the Spanish government to the assembly of the League of Nations; the report of the committee which examined the Spanish proposals, and the League of Nations' decision in the matter. The report of the committee failed to pass the league assembly by two votes, and I shall show where those two votes came from. I quote from the Monthly Summary of the League of Nations for September, 1937:

In the assembly on September 18th, the president of the Spanish council of ministers, M. Negrin, at the end of his speech on international problems arising out of the conflict in Spain, made the following declaration:

"The government of the Republic considers that it has the right to make the following requests:

- (1) That the aggression of Germany and Italy in Spain be recognized as such.
- (2) That, in consequence of this recognition, the league examine as rapidly as possible the means by which that aggression may be brought to an end.
- (3) That full rights once more be given to the Spanish government freely to acquire all the war material it may consider necessary.
- (4) That the non-Spanish combatants be withdrawn from Spanish territory.
- (5) That the measures to be adopted for security in the Mediterranean be extended to Spain, and that Spain be granted her legitimate share in them.

In conclusion, having summed up the declarations of the Spanish government, their representative asked that the part of the secretary-general's report on the work of the league which dealt with the situation in Spain and allied questions should be referred to the sixth committee. This was done, and the committee reported to the assembly to this effect:

The Assembly:

- (1) Associates itself with the council in recalling that it is the duty of every state to respect the territorial integrity and political independence of other states—a duty which, for members of the League of Nations, has been recognized by the covenant;
- (2) Affirms that every state is under an obligation to refrain from intervening in the internal affairs of another state;
- (3) Recalls the special undertakings entered into by the European governments, and the London non-intervention committee which, in