

"struggle" in communizing the non-Communist world. The existence of the document is important because it gives the Communist alliance at least an appearance of cohesion and unity and, by providing for future consultation as the need arises, it may have the effect of preventing disputes from breaking out again in public. It is too early to say that the document will not affect the policies of either the Soviet Union or China, but both sides are deeply committed to their present courses, which are rooted in the history and revolutionary experience of each.

### After the Moscow Conference

With the unity of the Soviet bloc restored at least superficially and the new United States Administration about to take office, Mr. Khrushchov's two conditions for a resumption of his pre-May course had been met by the end of the year, and there were signs at that time that he would resume his efforts to obtain, on his own terms, a settlement of the Berlin problem and a measure of disarmament. As early as October he had stated that the problem of Berlin and a German peace treaty must be solved by the end of 1961. In Berlin itself Communist harassing tactics were renewed in September (directed this time against the civilian population of West Berlin rather than against the occupying powers), presumably to remind the West of its difficult position in Berlin and of the need to negotiate. Late in December, in a major policy statement, the Soviet Foreign Minister declared that the Soviet Union was prepared to seek better relations with the United States, and he urged again Mr. Khrushchov's earlier proposals for a special high-level meeting of the United Nations General Assembly to discuss disarmament. A few days later, after lengthy negotiations, the Soviet Union renewed its trade agreement with West Germany. Whether or not, given the reluctance of his principal ally and the effect on Western opinion of his recent behaviour, Mr. Khrushchov would be able to return fully to his pre-May course was uncertain at the year's end. That he intended to try seemed probable.

The Soviet role in the Congo crisis can be attributed only in small part to the summit failure and the consequent events outlined above. The date of Congo independence and the unstable political situation in the Congo following independence were unrelated to the events of May. Since coming to power, Mr. Khrushchov has consistently sought by economic and ideological means to increase Soviet influence in the underdeveloped world and to diminish the influence of the West. The opportunity for political and economic activity presented by the Congo situation was therefore one the U.S.S.R. would not let pass. Even so, the effect of the Congo situation on East-West relations might not have been so serious if a stable central Congolese government had emerged after independence. When, however, the central government disintegrated, the Soviet Union was unable, because of the United Nations presence, to intervene in defense of the faction it considered represented its interests. Instead, its representative in the Congo was ignominiously expelled. The Soviet reaction to this rebuff was a violent attack on the Secretary-General by Mr. Khrushchov and a demand to limit his freedom of action by the substitution of a triumvirate for the office of the Secretary-General.