

accept formally additional requirements designed to minimize the proliferation risk. This policy applies to all countries in the South Asia region as well as elsewhere in the world.²⁰

At various times, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Japan have undertaken bilateral discussions on nonproliferation and regional security issues with India and Pakistan, urging them to sign the NPT, or at least engage in bilateral regional talks on nuclear issues. In 1991, the United States proposed multilateral discussions--termed "the Five Party" proposal--on regional security and nonproliferation in South Asia. Pakistan, Russia, and China accepted the proposal; India did not, arguing that the scope of the region to be considered did not encompass all the areas of security concern for it and objecting that Chinese strategic forces were left unaddressed. In November 1995, Australia's Deputy Prime Minister Kim Beazley urged India to help lead Australia's crusade for a world free of nuclear weapons.²¹ Recently Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien urged India to drop its opposition to the NPT. Concerned countries have also urged India and Pakistan to abide by the MTCR guidelines during bilateral talks.

Efforts to persuade New Delhi to sign the NPT--an "inherently discriminatory" agreement in the eyes of the Indians---have not only failed thus far, but some believe that they have backfired. Two Indian analysts, Deepa Ollapally and Raja Ramanna have complained quite specifically about the United States Government, arguing that it believes, incorrectly in their view, that "India is obstinate about the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, that India is vulnerable to technology-denying efforts, and that it can be equated with its neighbor, Pakistan."²² They claim that India has exercised restraint in its nuclear program, has wider strategic concerns than Pakistan (namely, China), and is impervious to American efforts to limit the transfer of dual-use technologies because of its advanced indigenous capabilities in the space and missile field. The comments of Ollapally and Ramanna are particularly pointed on the subject of the MTCR:

While analysts disagree on the exact extent of the MTCR's impact on India's missile program, its most lasting effect has been to spur greater self-sufficiency, with signs of eventual success. As with its nuclear capability, India has exercised restraint in missile deployment. In many ways it exemplifies India's tendency to have technology "demonstrations" as part of its strategic posture for sending strong signals of its capability without necessarily ratcheting up the arms race. While the United States depicts missiles as inherently destabilizing, it has not convincingly spelled out why they are more so in India's arsenals than in more powerful countries'. Most of

²⁰ Material in this and the preceding paragraph is drawn from "Canada's Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy." Government of Canada, Ottawa, 1985.

²¹ According to a Reuters report dated 17 November 1995.

²² "U.S.-India Tensions: Misperceptions on Nuclear Proliferation," Foreign Affairs, January/February 1995, p. 13.